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Summary
This thesis studies the equilibria in large games and Bayesian games and it consists
of four parts.
In the first part, we generalize the traditional Bayesian games by introduc-
ing a new game form, the so-called games with private and public information.
This new game model allows the players’ strategies to depend on their strategy-
relevant private information as well as on some publicly announced information.
The players’ payoffs depend on their own payoff-relevant private information and
some payoff-relevant common information. Under the assumption that the play-
ers’ strategy-relevant private information is diffuse and their private information is
conditionally independent given the public and payoff-relevant common informa-
tion, we directly prove the existence of pure strategy equilibrium for such a game
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by developing a distribution theory of correspondences via vector measures.
In the second part, we further explore this new game model by showing the
existence of mixed-strategy equilibria under general conditions. Moreover, under
the additional assumptions of finiteness of action spaces and diffuseness and condi-
tional independence of private information, a strong purification result is obtained
for the mixed strategies in such games. As a corollary, the existence of pure-
strategy equilibria follows. This corollary generalizes the main result in our first
part.
In the third part, we consider a generalized large game model where the agent
space is divided into countable subgroups and each players payoff depends on her
own action and the action distribution in each of the subgroups. Focusing on
the interaction between Nash equilibria and the best response correspondence of
the players, we characterize the pure-strategy equilibrium distributions in large
games endowed with countable actions, countable homogeneous groups of players,
or atomless Loeb agent spaces by showing that a given distribution is an equilibrium
distribution if and only if for any (Borel) subset of actions the proportion of players
in each group playing this subset of actions is no larger than the proportion of
players in that group having a best response in this subset. Furthermore, we also
present a counterexample showing that this characterization result does not hold
for a more general setting.
In the fourth part, we firstly present a unified proof for the existence of pure
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strategy equilibria in the three settings of large games mentioned above by showing
the existence of their common characterizing counterpart. Then we show that each
Bayesian game with countable players can induce a large game and the Bayesian
game has a pure strategy equilibria if and only if the induced large game has one.
This result enables us to apply the existence results in large games to Bayesian
games and obtain existence of pure strategy equilibria in four different settings of
Bayesian games. Finally, we also establish a connection between the generalized
Bayesian games with private and public information and large games. Based on
this connection and the existence results in large games, we obtain more general-
ized existence results of pure strategy equilibria in both Bayesian games and the
generalized Bayesian games with private and public information. These results




As a field of modern science, game theory was founded by John von Neumann and
Oskar Morgenstern in 1944 in their classic, Theory of games and economic behavior.
In 1950, John F. Nash showed that finite games with complete information always
have an equilibrium point, at which all players choose actions that are best for
them given other players’ choices. After Nash’s work, game theory has gradually
become a central part of the modern economics. Moreover, game theory also
finds applications in numerous other fields including biology, political science and
computer science.
In order to facilitate analysis, games are often classified into different types.
Depending on whether or not the players are allowed to form binding commitments,
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games are classified into cooperative games or noncooperative games. Depending
on whether or not the game is played simultaneously by all the players, games are
classified into static games and dynamic games. The games discussed in this paper,
i.e., Bayesian games and large games, all belong to noncooperative static games.
Bayesian games, also called games of incomplete information, are games in
which at least one player is uncertain about another player’s payoff function. While
players may not know other player’s exact payoff function, we assume they have
certain ‘belief’ about other player’s payoff function, that is, they know the ex ante
probability distribution of other player’s payoff function. Or equivalently, we can
view Bayesian games as games where each player’s payoff function is determined
by the realization of a random variable. The random variable’s actual realization
is observed only by the player but its ex ante probability distribution is known by
all the players. (See Harsanyi (1967-68).) The probability space underlying that
random variable can be regarded as the private information space pertaining to
the player.
The idea of diffuse information1 was introduced by Dvoretsky, Wald and Wol-
fowitz (See Dvoretsky et al. (1950, 1951)) and was used as an tool to eliminate the
randomization in decision rules and to ensure the existence of a pure strategy equi-
librium in two-person zero-sum games. Following Dvoretsky et al.’s idea of diffuse
information and Harsanyi (1967-68, 1973)’s framework, Milgrom and Weber (1981,
1The information space is said to be diffuse if it is an atomless probability space.
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1985) and Radner and Rosenthal (1982) gave a comprehensive theory of Bayesian
games and proved the existence of pure strategy equilibria in Bayesian games with
a finite number of players and a finite number of actions. Khan and Sun (1995) pre-
sented a generalized existence result of pure strategy equilibria, which allows play-
ers to have countably many (finite or countably infinite) actions. Khan and Sun
(1999) models the set of players as a Loeb space and shows the existence of pure
strategy equilibria in Bayesian games with uncountable actions.
In contrast, a large game is a game where the set of players is endowed with
an atomless measure. Thus the number of the players in a large game is at least
uncountable. Here, the atomless assumption formalizes the “negligible” influence
of each individual player and hence large games “enable us to analyze a conflict
situation where the single player has no influence on the situation but the ag-
gregative behavior of ‘large’ sets of players can change the payoffs.”2 Therefore,
large games are good models for large economies. Examples of large games are nu-
merous, include elections, markets, exchanges, corporations (from the shareholders
viewpoint) and so on.
The idea of modeling the set of players as an atomless measure space was intro-
duced in 1961 by Milnor and Shapley. Aumann (1964) made important contribu-
tions to the justification and distribution of this idea. Using Aumann’s methods,
Schmeidler (1973) shows the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium in a large
2Quoted from Schmeidler (1973).
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game where each player is endowed with finite actions. Khan and Sun (1995) gen-
eralized the result of Schmeidler (1973) to allow a countable set of pure strategies.
The usage of hyperfinite Loeb spaces in modeling large games was systematically
studied in Khan and Sun (1996, 1999). By modeling the set of players as a Loeb
space, Khan and Sun (1999) shows the existence of Nash equilibria in large games
without any countability assumption on action or payoff space, which is false when
the agent space is modeled by Lebesgue unit interval (see Khan et al., 1997). This
major success, among others, led them to argue Loeb spaces as the ‘right’ tool for
modeling games with a large number of players.3
1.2 Motivations and contributions
In this paper, we first notice that in some situations, the players in a Bayesian game
may encounter another type of information which is to be publicly announced to
them and may influence their strategies. To study such a situation, we introduce
a new game form which incorporates this new type of information, the so-called
“public information”. Our game model thus generalizes the game models consid-
ered in Milgrom and Weber (1985) and Radner and Rosenthal (1982).
Our next two chapters focus on this generalized Bayesian game model. The
next chapter gives a direct proof of the existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium
3For a recent survey of large games, see Khan and Sun (2002).
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without using mixed-strategies. The proof itself has its conceptual advantage (if
the players play a pure-strategy equilibrium, they will search among the pure
strategies to reach an equilibrium) and is shorter than the indirect approach of
using mixed-strategies and then purification. The mathematical method for the
direct proof also has independent interest.
While the second chapter is solely focusing on pure strategy equilibrium, we
notice that the existence result of a pure strategy equilibrium relies on some strong
assumptions including the finiteness of the action spaces, finiteness of the public
and the common information spaces and diffuseness and conditional independence
of the private information spaces. However, those assumptions may not be always
satisfied in realistic situations. Thus, the pure-strategy equilibria may not always
exist and it is worth examining the existence of mixed-strategy equilibria under
more general conditions, which becomes the main objective of the third chapter.
In the third chapter, we first show the existence existence of mixed-strategy
equilibria for such a game without those strong assumptions. Moreover, by using a
similar technique as in Khan et al. (2006), a strong purification result is obtained
for all mixed strategies in such a game under similar conditions as in the first
chapter.
Thus the strong purification result, together with the existence result of mixed-
strategy equilibria, also shows the existence of pure-strategy equilibria for such a
game. This existence result of pure-strategy equilibria also covers and improves
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the corresponding result in the first chapter. Therefore, all the existence results
of pure-strategy equilibria in Radner and Rosenthal (1982), Milgrom and Weber
(1985) and Fu et al. (2007a) can be regarded as special cases of this result.
Chapter 4 is for characterizing large games. We notice that in the past few
decades, there have been a lot of famous existence or nonexistence results for pure-
strategy Nash equilibria in different settings of large games (see, for example, the
survey Chapter in Khan and Sun (2002)). However, very few studies focus on char-
acterizing the pure-strategy Nash equilibria or equilibrium distributions. Clearly,
good characterization results are also valuable since they can help us better un-
derstand the Nash equilibria and also provide alternative ideas for proving the
existence of Nash equilibria. It is the aim of this chapter to make some contribu-
tions in filling this gap. In particular, this chapter presents three characterization
results and a counterexample for the equilibrium distributions in large games.
Chapter 5 is for connecting large games and Bayesian games. It has long been
noted that there is a close relationship between large games and Bayesian games.
(see eg, Mas-Colell (1984), Khan and Sun (1995, 1999)). But no formal connection
was established between the two types of games. They are still regarded as two
separate types of games without any direct links. In this chapter, we shall establish
a formal connection among them, which shows that any Bayesian game can induce
a generic large game and the Bayesian game has a pure strategy (Bayesian Nash)
equilibrium iff the induced large game has a pure strategy (Nash) equilibrium.
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Based on the above connection, we aim to unify the existence results of pure
strategy equilibria for large games and Bayesian games. We also provide a unified
approach for showing the existence of the pure strategy equilibria such that the
proofs are greatly simplified and new results are discovered.4
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Chapter 2
Pure-strategy equilibria in games with
private and public information1
2.1 Introduction
We introduce a generalized Bayesian game model which allows the players’ strate-
gies to depend on their strategy-relevant private information as well as on some
publicly announced information. The players’ payoffs depend on their own payoff-
relevant private information and some payoff-relevant common information. The
purpose of this chapter is to show that pure strategy equilibrium exists for such
game if the players’ strategy-relevant private information is diffuse and their pri-
vate information is conditionally independent given the public and payoff-relevant
common information.
1This chapter is based on the joint publication of Fu, Sun, Yannlis and Zhang in 2007.
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The proof of the existence of pure strategy equilibrium in our setting is far from
trivial and requires the use of some new mathematical techniques. In particular, we
develop a distribution theory of correspondences via vector measures that involves
convexity, compactness and preservation of upper semi-continuity. This type of
results allows us to apply Kakutani’s fixed point theorem to prove the existence
result based only on pure strategies. As noted in (Khan and Sun, 1995, p. 637),
such a direct proof on the existence of pure strategy equilibrium using only pure
strategies does have some advantages from a game-theoretic point of view. In
particular, one does not need to go through mixed (or behavioral) strategies that
are considered to have limited appeal in many practical situations.
The chapter is organized as follows. In section 2, we introduce the game with
private and public information and state the existence of pure strategy equilibrium
for such a game. Section 3 contains the main mathematical tool that is needed for
our existence proof. Section 4 contains some concluding remarks. All the proofs
are given in the appendix.
2.2 Games with private and public information
Consider a game Γ with private and public information formulated as follows. The
game has finitely many players i = 1, . . . , l. Each player i is endowed with a
finite action set Ai, a measurable space (Ti, Ti) representing her strategy-relevant
2.2 Games with private and public information 10
private information, and another measurable space (Si,Si) representing her payoff-
relevant private information. A finite set T0 = {t01, . . . , t0m} represents those
states that are to be publicly announced to all the players; let T0 be the power
set on T0. Another finite set S0 = {s01, . . . , s0n} represents the payoff-relevant
common states that affect the payoffs of all the players with S0 the power set on
S0. Thus, the product measurable space (Ω,F) = (Πlj=0(Sj × Tj),Πlj=0(Sj × Tj))
equipped with a probability measure η constitutes the information space of the
game. For each player i, her payoff function is a mapping from A× S0 × Si to R,
i.e. ui : A × S0 × Si −→ R. Here A = Πlj=1Aj is the set of the players’ action
profiles; and assume that for any a ∈ A, ui(a, s0, si) is integrable on (Ω,F , η).
For each player i, she can use her private information as well as the publicly
announced information. Thus, a pure strategy for player i is a measurable mapping
from T0×Ti to Ai; and let Meas(T0×Ti, Ai) be the space of all measurable mappings
from T0 × Ti to Ai. A pure strategy profile is a collection g = (g1, . . . , gl) of pure
strategies that specify a pure strategy for each player. For a player i = 1, . . . , l, we
shall use the following (conventional) notation: A−i = Π1≤j≤l,j 6=iAj, a = (ai, a−i)
for a ∈ A, and g = (gi, g−i) for a strategy profile g.2
To sum up, our game is of the form Γ = {A1, . . . , Al;T0;S0;T1, . . . , Tl;
S1, . . . , Sl;u1, . . . , ul}, where A1, . . . , Al are the player’s action spaces, T0 is their
public information space, S0 is their payoff-relevant common information space,
2From now on, without any ambiguity, we shall abbreviate Π1≤j≤l,j 6=i to Πj 6=i.
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T1, . . . , Tl are their strategy-relevant private information spaces, S1, . . . , Sl are their
payoff-relevant private information spaces and u1, . . . , ul are their payoff functions.
If the players play a pure strategy profile g = (g1, . . . , gl), the resulting expected
payoff for player i can be written as
Ui(g) = Ui(g1, . . . , gl) =
∫
Ω
ui(g1(t0, t1), . . . , gl(t0, tl), s0, si)dη. (2.1)
A pure strategy equilibrium for Γ is a pure strategy profile g∗ = (g∗1, . . . , g
∗
l ), such
that for each i = 1, . . . , l, g∗i maximizes Ui(gi, g
∗
−i) for gi ∈ Meas(T0 × Ti, Ai).
The marginal measure of η on (T0×S0, T0×S0) is denoted by η0. For simplicity,
we denote η0({t0k, s0q}) by αkq. For each given t0k ∈ T0 and s0q ∈ S0, let ηkq denote
the conditional probability measure of η on the space (Πlj=1(Tj×Sj),Πlj=1(Tj×Sj)).
For each player i = 1, . . . , l, let τi be the marginal measure of η on the space (Ti, Ti),
ρkqi the marginal measure of η
kq on the space ((Ti×Si)×Πj 6=iTj, (Si×Ti)×Πj 6=iTj),
νkqi the marginal measure of η
kq on the space (Ti × Si, Ti × Si), and µkqi be the
marginal measure of ηkq on the space (Ti, Ti).
Definition 1. (1) The players’ strategy-relevant private information is said to be
diffuse if the marginal measure τi of η on the space (Ti, Ti) is atomless for each
player i = 1, . . . , l.
(2) The players’ private information is said to be conditionally independent
given the public and payoff-relevant common information if for each player i =
1, . . . , l, her strategy and payoff-relevant information is conditionally independent
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of all other players’ strategy-relevant information, given t0 ∈ T0 and s0 ∈ S0. That






j for k = 1, . . . ,m and q = 1, . . . , n.
The following result shows the existence of pure strategy equilibrium for the
game Γ under the assumption of diffuse and conditionally independent information.
Theorem 1. If the players’ strategy-relevant private information is diffuse and
their private information is conditionally independent given the public and payoff-
relevant common information, then there exists a pure strategy equilibrium for the
game Γ.
Independent payoff-relevant and strategy-relevant private information is used
in the game studied in Radner and Rosenthal (1982). Milgrom and Weber (1985)
considers games with payoff-relevant common information and private information
that influences players’ strategies and payoffs.3 Our model introduces the new
concept of public information that influences all players’ strategies, in addition
to payoff-relevant and strategy-relevant private information and payoff-relevant
common information. It is obvious that the existence results of pure strategy
equilibrium in Milgrom and Weber (1985) and Radner and Rosenthal (1982) are
special cases of our Theorem 1.4
3See Khan et al. (2006) for a unified approach to the purification of mixed strategies by using
a consequence of the Dvoretzky-Wald-Wolfowitz Theorem in Dvoretsky et al. (1951).
4The existence result of pure strategy equilibrium in Milgrom and Weber (1985) is stated as
a consequence of purification. However, the purification result in Milgrom and Weber (1985)
does not follow directly from the original result in Dvoretsky et al. (1951) as claimed therein,
but from a new corollary of the Dvoretzky-Wald-Wolfowitz Theorem formulated in Khan et al.
(2006), where a stronger result on purification is also proved.
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2.3 Distribution of correspondences via vector
measures
In this section we present some properties of the distribution of correspondences
induced by vector measures, which will be used to prove Theorem 1. We recall
some basic notions first.
Let Ω and X be nonempty sets, and P(X) the power set of X. A mapping
from Ω to P(X) \ {∅} is called a correspondence from Ω to X.
Let F be a correspondence from a measurable space (Ω,F) to a complete
separable metric space X with its Borel σ-algebra B(X), where F is a σ-algebra
on Ω. The correspondence F is said to be measurable if for each closed subset C of
X, the set {ω ∈ Ω : F (ω) ∩ C 6= ∅} is measurable in F . The correspondence F is
said to be closed valued if F (ω) is a closed subset of X for each ω ∈ Ω. A function
f from (Ω,F) to X is said to be a measurable selection of F if f is measurable and
f(ω) ∈ F (ω) for all ω ∈ Ω. When F is measurable and closed valued, the classical
Kuratowski-Ryll-Nardzewski Theorem (see, for example, (Aliprantis and Border,
1994, p.505)) says that F has a measurable selection.
Let M(X) be the space of Borel probability measures on X endowed with
the topology of weak convergence of measures. Let ν be a probability measure
and µ = (µ1, . . . , µm) a vector measure on (Ω,F), where each µk is a probability
measure for k = 1, . . . ,m. (Ω,F , µ) is called a vector probability measure space.
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For a measurable mapping ϕ from a probability space (Ω,F , ν) to X, we use νϕ−1
to denote the Borel probability measure on X induced by ϕ, which is often called
the distribution of ϕ. We also use µϕ−1 to denote (µ1ϕ−1, . . . , µmϕ−1), which
belongs to (M(X))m. When X is a finite set {x1, . . . , xd},M(X) can be identified
with the simplex ∆ = {(x1, . . . , xd) : xi ≥ 0,
∑d
i=1 xi = 1} under the Euclidean
metric.
Next, let G be a correspondence from a topological space Y to another topo-
logical space Z. Let y0 be a point in Y . Then G is said to be upper semicontinuous
at y0 if for any open set U which contains G(y0), there exists a neighborhood V of
y0 such that y ∈ V implies that G(y) ⊆ U . G is said to be upper semicontinuous
on Y if it is upper semicontinuous at every point y ∈ Y .
Now we state our main result about the distribution of correspondences induced
by a vector measure when the target space is a finite set.
Proposition 1. Let A be a finite set, Y a metric space, (Ω,F , µ) an atomless
vector probability measure space,5 and F a correspondence from Ω × Y to A. For
each fixed y ∈ Y , let Fy denote the correspondence F (·, y) from Ω to A, which is
assumed to be measurable. Let G be a correspondence from Y to (M(A))m such
that for each y ∈ Y ,
G(y) = {µϕ−1 : ϕ(·) is a measurable selection from Fy(·)}. (2.2)
5It means that µk is atomless for each 1 ≤ k ≤ m.
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Then, (1) G is convex and compact valued; (2) if, in addition, the correspondence
F (ω, ·) is upper semicontinuous on Y for each fixed ω ∈ Ω, then G is upper semi-
continuous on Y .
Consider the simple case that µ is a scalar probability measure (i.e., m =
1). All the three properties of convexity, compactness, and preservation of upper
semicontinuity in the above theorem on the distribution of correspondences may
fail when A is not assumed to be finite (see Examples 1, 2 and 3 in Sun (1996) for
the case that A = [−1, 1]).
2.4 Concluding remarks
The game introduced in this chapter can be easily extended to a social system
by including constraint correspondences where action sets depend on the informa-
tion of individual players . Such a framework may be useful to applications for
economies with private information and also public information (see, for exam-
ple Glycopantis and Yannelis (2005)). Thus, the standard Walrasian expectation
equilibrium notions may be generalized by including the public information aspect
as used in this chapter.
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2.5 Appendix
2.5.1 Proof of Theorem 1
First fix i = 1, . . . , l. Denote gi(t0k, ti) by g
k
i (ti) for k = 1, . . . ,m. Thus, for each k,
gki is a mapping from Ti to Ai. With the assumption of conditional independence
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Now we define the conditional expectation
vkqi (a, ti) = E(ui(a, s0q, s˜i)|t˜i = ti),

















































































It means that player i’s expected payoff depends on the actions of the other
players only through the conditional distributions of their strategies (given the
payoff-relevant common information s0q and public information t0k) induced on
their action spaces. Recall that the marginal measure τi of η on the space (Ti, Ti)
is atomless. This implies that if αkq > 0, µ
kq
i is also atomless. When αkq = 0, we
can redefine µkqi to be τi without changing anything. Thus, we can assume that
µkqi is also atomless for each k = 1, . . . ,m, and q = 1, . . . , n.













(ti) = 1 for
λki -almost all ti. For a given γ ∈ Πlj=1 [(M(Aj))n],6 Equation (2.5) says that for
each state of public information t0 = t0k, k = 1, . . . ,m, player i should choose a
6For any player j, let γj = (γ1j , . . . , γ
n
j ) ∈ (M(Aj))n, which can be interpreted as a conditional
distribution for player j’s strategy given the payoff-relevant common information s0q and public
information t0k. Let γ = (γ1, . . . , γl) which specifies a conditional distribution for each player
while γ−i specifies the conditional distributions for all the players except for player i.
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vkqi (ai, a−i, ti)dΠj 6=iγ
q
j (a−i). (2.7)
It is obvious that for each ai in the finite set Ai, w
k
i (ai, ti, γ) is Ti-measurable with
respect to ti ∈ Ti, and continuous with respect to γ ∈ Πlj=1 [(M(Aj))n].
For a fixed k ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and for any γ ∈ Πlj=1 [(M(Aj))n], ti ∈ Ti, let
Φki (ti, γ) = Argmaxai∈Aiw
k
i (ai, ti, γ). (2.8)
For each fixed ti ∈ Ti, the correspondence Φki (ti, ·) is upper semicontinuous on
Πlj=1 [(M(Aj))n] by Berge’s maximum theorem (see, e.g., (Aliprantis and Border,
1994, p.473)). For any fixed γ ∈ Πlj=1 [(M(Aj))n], the correspondence Φki (·, γ) is
measurable by Theorem 14.91 in (Aliprantis and Border, 1994, p.508).
Consider a pure strategy profile g∗ = (g∗1, . . . , g
∗
l ) and let g
∗k = (g∗k1 , . . . , g
∗k
l )
be defined as g∗ki (·) = g∗i (t0k; ·), k = 1, . . . ,m.
Denote the n-dimensional vector measure (µk1i , . . . , µ
kn
i ) by µ
k
i . Let γ
∗k
i be the
conditional distribution µki (g
∗k
i )
−1 of player i, and γ∗k = (γ∗k1 , . . . , γ
∗k
l ). Then, g
∗
7The function V kγi (g
k
i ) is actually independent of γi. However, it is more convenient, as we
do, to take the whole γ as a parameter.
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is a pure strategy equilibrium for the game Γ if and only if for each player i and
each k, g∗ki maximizes V
kγ∗k
i (·) on the space Meas(Ti, Ai).8 This condition can be
satisfied if g∗ki is a measurable selection of the correspondence Φ
k
i (·, γ∗k) for any k
and i.
We shall now show the existence of such a pure strategy profile g∗. For any
γ ∈ Πlj=1 [(M(Aj))n] and any k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, let
Gki (γ) = {µkiϕ−1 : ϕ(·) is a measurable selection from Φki (·, γ)}, (2.9)
and Gk(γ) = Πli=1G
k
i (γ). Proposition 1 implies that for each i, G
k
i (·) is convex and
compact valued, and upper-semicontinuous on Πlj=1 [(M(Aj))n], so is the product
Gk(γ). By the Kakutani Fixed Point Theorem, there exists a γ∗k = (γ∗k1 , . . . , γ
∗k
l ) ∈
Πlj=1 [(M(Aj))n] such that γ∗k ∈ Gk(γ∗k). This means that for each player i
and each k, γ∗ki ∈ Gki (γ∗k), i.e., there exists a measurable selection g∗ki of the




= γ∗ki . Therefore, the pure strategy
profile g∗ = (g∗1, . . . , g
∗
l ) is a pure strategy equilibrium for the game Γ. Q.E.D.
2.5.2 Proof of Proposition 1
To prove Proposition 1, we need part of Corollary 1 in Khan et al. (2006), which
is presented in the following lemma for the convenience of the reader. The result
is a simple consequence of Theorem 2.1 in Dvoretsky et al. (1951).
8The space of all measurable mappings from Ti to Ai
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Lemma 1. Let (Ω,F , µ) be an atomless vector probability measure space with
µ = (µ1, . . . , µm), A a finite set with elements a1, . . . , ad, and g : Ω → M(A)
a measurable mapping. Then there exists a measurable mapping g∗ : Ω → A such
that g∗(ω) ∈ supp g(ω) = {a ∈ A : g(ω)({a}) > 0} for all ω ∈ Ω, and for each
a ∈ A, ∫
Ω
g(ω)({a})dµ(ω) = µg∗−1({a}).
Let An, n = 1, 2, . . . be a sequence of sets in a metric space X. A point
x ∈ X is said to be a cluster point of the sequence of sets if every neighborhood
of x intersects infinitely many An. The set of all such cluster points is denoted
by cl-LimnAn, which is also called topological limes superior (see, for example,
Definition 3.10 in Sun (1996)). Note that when X is a finite set, one can use any
metric introducing the discrete topology.
Before proving Proposition 1, we prove two more lemmas.
Lemma 2. Let f = (f1, . . . , fd) and f
n = (fn1 , . . . , f
n
d ), n = 1, 2, . . . , be measurable
functions from a probability space (Ω,F , ν) to the unit simplex ∆ = {(x1, . . . , xd) :
xi ≥ 0,
∑d
i=1 xi = 1}. Assume that for each k ∈ {1, . . . , d}, fnk converges to
fk in the weak star topology σ(L
∞(Ω), L1(Ω)). Then, for ν-almost all ω ∈ Ω,
{k ∈ {1, . . . , d} : fk(ω) > 0} ⊆ cl-Limn{k ∈ {1, . . . , d} : fnk (ω) > 0}.
Proof. Suppose not. Then there exists a measurable subset E ⊆ Ω of positive
measure with respect to ν, with the following property: for all ω ∈ E, the inclusion
relation {k′ ∈ {1, . . . , d} : fk′(ω) > 0} ⊆ cl-Limn{k′ ∈ {1, . . . , d} : fnk′(ω) > 0} fails.
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So there exists a k ∈ {1, . . . , d} and a set Ek ⊆ E with ν-positive measure, such
that for any ω ∈ Ek, fk(ω) > 0, and k /∈ cl-Limn{k′ ∈ {1, . . . , d} : fnk′(ω) > 0},
which means that k /∈ {k′ ∈ {1, . . . , d} : fnk′(ω) > 0} for sufficiently large n. Thus,
for any ω ∈ Ek, fnk (ω) = 0 for sufficiently large n.
Let 1Ek be the indicator function of Ek. Note that f
n
k is assumed to converge
to fk in the weak star topology σ(L















fnk (ω)dν(ω), which equals zero for
sufficiently large n, and thus the left hand side of Equation (2.10) is zero. On





fk(ω)dν(ω), which is strictly positive since ν(Ek) > 0, and fk(ω) > 0 for any
ω ∈ Ek. This is a contradiction. Q.E.D.
Next we turn to Lemma 3.
Lemma 3. Let (Ω,F , µ) be an atomless vector probability measure space with µ =
(µ1, . . . , µm), A = {a1, . . . , ad}, and ϕn, n = 1, 2, . . . a sequence of measurable
functions from (Ω,F) to A. Let µϕ−1n = (µ1ϕ−1n , . . . , µmϕ−1n ) for n ≥ 1, and
τ = (τ1, . . . , τm) a vector of probability measures on A. Assume that for each k =
1, . . . ,m, and each a ∈ A, µk(ϕ−1n ({a})) converges to τk({a})) as n goes to infinity.
Then there exists a measurable selection ϕ of the correspondence H = cl-Limn{ϕn}
such that µϕ−1 = τ .
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Proof. Since A is finite, the classical Alaoglu Compactness Theorem (see,
for example, (Aliprantis and Border, 1994, p.158)) implies that there exists a
subsequence ϕnq , q = 1, 2, . . . of ϕn, n = 1, 2, . . . such that for each a ∈ A,
{1{a}(ϕnq(·)) : q = 1, 2, . . . } converges to some function fa(·) ∈ L∞(Ω,F , |µ|)




For each q ≥ 1 and each a ∈ A, let f qa(·) = 1{a}(ϕnq(·)); then f qa , a ∈ A
are non-negative functions satisfying
∑
a∈A fa(·) ≡ 1. Since f qa(·) converges to
fa(·) in the weak star topology σ(L∞(Ω,F , |µ|), L1(Ω,F , |µ|)) as q goes to infinity,
fa(ω), a ∈ A are non-negative with summation one for |µ|-almost all ω ∈ Ω; we
can assume, without loss of generality, that this property holds for all ω ∈ Ω.
By the convergence assumption in the statement of the lemma, we have
∫
Ω
f qa(ω)dµk = µk(ϕ
−1
nq ({a})),
which converges to τk({a})) as q goes to infinity. Let dµk/d|µ| be the Radon-
Nikodym derivative of µk with respect to |µ|. Since f qa(·) converges to fa(·) in the




























It follows from Lemma 2 that for |µ|-almost all ω ∈ Ω,
{a ∈ A : fa(ω) > 0} ⊆ cl-Limq{a ∈ A : f qa(ω) > 0}
= cl-Limq{ϕnq(ω)} ⊆ cl-Limn{ϕn(ω)}.
Define a mapping g on Ω by letting g(ω)({a}) = fa(ω) for ω ∈ Ω and a ∈ A.
Then g is a measurable mapping from Ω to M(A). Applying Lemma 1 to g, we
know that there exists a measurable mapping ϕ : Ω → A such that ϕ(ω) ∈ {a ∈




−1 = τ . Note that
we also have ϕ(ω) ∈ cl-Limn{ϕn(ω)} for |µ|-almost all ω ∈ Ω. By modifying the
values of ϕ on a |µ|-null set through a measurable selection of cl-Limn{ϕn(·)}, we
can require that ϕ(ω) ∈ cl-Limn{ϕn(ω)} for all ω ∈ Ω. Q.E.D.
We are now ready to prove Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 1. Fix y ∈ Y . To prove the convexity, let c ∈ [0, 1] and
ϕ and ϕ˜ be two measurable selections from Fy(·). Let τ = c µϕ−1 + (1− c)µϕ˜−1.
Define a mapping f : Ω→M(A) by letting f(ω) = cδϕ(ω) + (1− c)δϕ˜(ω), where δa
is the Dirac measure at a for a ∈ A. Then τ({a}) = ∫
Ω
f(ω)({a})dµ(ω) for any
a ∈ A. By Lemma 1, there exists a measurable function ψ : Ω → A such that
τ = µψ−1 and ψ(ω) ∈ {ϕ(ω), ϕ˜(ω)} for all ω ∈ Ω. Since {ϕ(ω), ϕ˜(ω)} ⊆ Fy(ω),
this implies that ψ is a measurable selection of Fy. Hence τ ∈ G(y) and G(y) is
convex.
Now we turn to the upper semicontinuity of G(·), or equivalently, the closeness
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of the graph of correspondence G(·). Suppose that yn converges to y in Y , τn =
µϕ−1n ∈ G(yn) and τn converges to τ , where ϕn(·) ∈ Fyn(·). We need only show that
τ ∈ G(y). In fact, Lemma 3 implies that there exists a measurable selection ϕ of
the correspondence cl-Limn{ϕn} such that µϕ−1 = τ . The upper-semicontinuity of
Fy with respect to y implies the relation cl-Limn{ϕn} ⊆ Fy. So ϕ is a measurable
selection of Fy, hence τ ∈ G(y). Thus we obtain the upper-semicontinuity of the
correspondence G(·).
Since (M(A))m is compact, the compactness of G(·) follows from its closedness
while the closedness follows from upper-semicontinuity by taking yn = y above.
Q.E.D.
Chapter 3
Mixed-strategy equilibria and strong
purification1
3.1 Introduction
For a game with incomplete information, three types of information, namely strategy-
relevant private information, payoff-relevant private information and payoff-relevant
common information, are considered in previous literatures (see Radner and Rosenthal
(1982), Milgrom and Weber (1985), Yannelis and Rustichini (1991) and Khan and Sun
(1999)). Furthermore, the players’ strategy-relevant private information which de-
termines the players’ strategies is assumed to be independent in pure-strategy equi-
libria and absolutely continuous in mixed-strategy equilibria. However, there may
1A paper based on this chapter has been accepted for publication by Economic Theory in
2007. (See Fu (2007))
25
3.1 Introduction 26
be situations that cannot be accommodated by the above settings. In particular,
as we can see from the example below, some games with incomplete information
may involve a kind of public information which influences all players’ strategies.
Example 1. Suppose a bread producer needs about q tons wheat six months later
and he wants to sign a future contract with a farmer to fix the price at around p.
According to the history, the yield and cost of the wheat are highly correlated to the
precipitation. Thus, the farmer wants the contract to depend on the precipitation.
Therefore, they negotiate the following contract. If the precipitation in the next
six months is within a certain range which represents a normal-level (neither good
nor bad) precipitation, then the bread producer will get q tons wheat from the
farmer with price p. If the precipitation is within another range representing a
very good one, then the bread producer can choose a lower price, pl and the farmer
can require the bread producer to buy either q tons or a larger quantity, qh tons.
If the precipitation is not within both of the above ranges, then the farmer can
demand a higher price, ph and the bread producer can decide to buy either q tons
or a smaller quantity, ql tons. Furthermore, the future precipitation is predicted
by weather bureau with an ex ante probability distribution, which is known to the
both parties. Without loss of generality, we assume that the payoff function (profit
function) for each of them depends on their actions on choosing the quantity and
price of the wheat, their payoff-relevant common information and her own payoff-
relevant private information.
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Thus, future precipitation in this example is a kind of public information which
is known to all and affects both players’ strategies. Note that the players’ strategy-
relevant information, the combination of public information and strategy-relevant
private information, is not mutually independent and may also not be absolutely
continuous.
Fu et al. (2007a) introduced a new game model which contains the above four
types of information. It is shown in that paper through a direct proof that pure-
strategy equilibria exist for such a game under the assumptions of finiteness of
the action spaces, finiteness of the public and the common information spaces
and diffuseness and conditional independence of the private information spaces.
However, all the above assumptions are quite strong and hence they may not be
satisfied in some situations. Thus, the pure-strategy equilibria may not always
exist and it is worthwhile to examine the existence of mixed-strategy equilibria
under more general conditions.
The first part of this chapter shows the existence of mixed-strategy equilibria
for such a game without those strong assumptions. In particular, a mixed-strategy
equilibrium is shown to exist when the action spaces are compact metric spaces,
the public information space is a countable (finite or countably infinite) set and the
common and private information spaces are general measurable spaces. It is also
noted that the existence result of mixed-strategy equilibria in Milgrom and Weber
(1985) is a special case of this result.
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Moreover, by using a similar technique as in Khan et al. (2006), a strong pu-
rification result is obtained for all mixed strategies in such a game under similar
conditions as in Fu et al. (2007a) except for two differences. Firstly, we generalize
the result to allow the public information to be a countable space. Secondly, we
divide the common information into two different types of which the first type is
dependent on the strategy-relevant private information and the second type is not,
and we assume that the first-type common information is finite and the second-type
common information is arbitrary.
Thus, the strong purification result, together with the existence result of mixed-
strategy equilibria, also shows the existence of pure-strategy equilibria for such a
game. It is thus clear that this existence result of pure-strategy equilibria cov-
ers and improves the corresponding result in Fu et al. (2007a). Therefore, all
the existence results of pure-strategy equilibria in Radner and Rosenthal (1982),
Milgrom and Weber (1985) and Fu et al. (2007a) can be regarded as special cases
of this result.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the game model with
private and public information. Section 3 shows the existence of mixed-strategy
equilibria for such a game. Section 4 presents the strong purification result and
the existence result of pure-strategy equilibria. All the proofs are given in the
appendix.
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3.2 Games with private and public information
Consider a game Γ with private and public information formulated as follows.
(i) The game has finitely many players i = 1, . . . , n.
(ii) The action space for each player i, denoted by Ai, is a compact metric
space.
(iii) For each player i, a measurable space (Ti,Ti) represents her strategy-
relevant private information.
(iv) A discrete measurable space (T0,T0), where T0 = {t0k : k ∈ K} is a
countable (finite or infinite) set and T0 is the power set on T0, represents the
public information that is to be announced to all the players.
(v) For each player i, another measurable space (Si,Si) represents her payoff-
relevant private information.
(vi) A measurable space (S0,S0) represents the (payoff-relevant) common in-
formation that affects the payoffs of all the players.





equipped with a probability measure η constitutes the information space of the
game.
(viii) For each player i, she can use her strategy-relevant private information
as well as the public information. Thus, a pure strategy for player i is an element
of Meas(T0 × Ti, Ai), where Meas(T0 × Ti, Ai) denotes the space of all measurable
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mappings from T0×Ti to Ai. Amixed strategy for player i is an element ofMeas(T0×
Ti,M(Ai)), where M(Ai) denotes the set of all Borel probability measures on
Ai with the topology of weak convergence.
2 A mixed (pure) strategy profile is a
collection g = (g1, . . . , gn) of mixed (pure) strategies that specify a mixed (pure)
strategy for each player.
(ix)Let A :=
∏n
i=1Ai denote the space of the players’ action profiles. For
each player i, her payoff function is a mapping from A × S0 × Si to R, i.e. ui :
A× S0 × Si −→ R.
For a player i = 1, . . . , n, we shall use the following (conventional) notation:
A−i =
∏
1≤j≤n,j 6=iAj, T−i =
∏
1≤j≤n,j 6=i Tj, a = (ai, a−i) for a ∈ A, and g =






Remark 1. In Milgrom and Weber (1985), the strategy-relevant and the payoff-
relevant private information are assumed to be the same. However, since the payoff-
relevant private information may serve to reveal the random factors which affect
the player’s payoff but ‘go beyond the control of player and cannot be influenced
by their actions’ (Yannelis and Rustichini, 1991, p24), it is possible that these two
types of information are different.
2Under this topology, g ∈ Meas(T0 × Ti,M(Ai)) means that g(·, ·)(B) is T0 ⊗Ti-measurable
for each B ∈ B(Ai), where B(Ai) denotes the set of all Borel sets in Ai. The mixed strategy
defined here is called a behavioral strategy in Milgrom and Weber (1985).
3.3 The existence of mixed-strategy equilibria 31
3.3 The existence of mixed-strategy equilibria
Let τ˜ denote the marginal probability measure of η on the space (T˜ :=
∏n
i=0 Ti, T˜ :=⊗n





the marginal of η on (T0,T0) and τi the marginal of η on the space (Ti,Ti) for
i = 1, . . . , n. Without loss of generality, we assume that τ0(t0k) > 0 for each
k ∈ K.
Assume that the players play the mixed strategy g = {gi}ni=1. For each i =
1, . . . , n, let gi(t0, ti;Bi) represent the value of the probability measure gi(t0, ti) at
Bi ∈ B(Ai) and gi(t0, ti; dai) the integration operator with respect to it.
We suppose our game model also satisfies the following conditions:
(C1) each payoff function ui satisfies
(i) ui is B(A)⊗F -measurable on A× Ω,
(ii) ui(·, s0, si) is continuous on A for every (s0, si) ∈ S0 × Si,
(iii) |ui| ≤ ϕi on A× Ω for some ϕi ∈ L1(Ω,F , η), and
(C2) τ is absolutely continuous with respect to
∏n
i=1 τi.






ui(a, s0, si)g1(t0, t1; da1) . . . gn(t0, tn; dan)dη.
The following Theorem shows the existence of a mixed strategy equilibrium for
game Γ when condition (C1) and (C2) are satisfied.
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Theorem 2. Suppose that (C1) and (C2) hold. Then there exists a mixed strategy
equilibrium for the game Γ.
Remark 2. Compared with the existence result of pure-strategy equilibria in Fu et al.
(2007a), this existence result of mixed-strategy equilibria removes those strong con-
ditions including the finiteness of the action spaces, the finiteness of the public and
the common information spaces and the diffuseness and conditional independence
of the private information spaces.
In Milgrom and Weber (1985), the payoff function3 for player i, ui, is defined
to be a bounded and measurable equicontinuous function from A × T0 × T to R
and in Balder (1988), the payoff function is defined to be a function from A×T to
R satisfying a condition similar to (C1). Since we can let S0 = T0 and Si = T for
each i = 1, . . . , n, it is clear that the existence results of mixed-strategy equilibria
in the above two papers can be regarded as special cases of Theorem 2.
3.4 Strong purification and pure-strategy equi-
libria
The concept of strong purification has been initially introduced by Khan et al. in
2006. This strengthened concept of purification is useful in that it unifies various
3In the part of finding a pure-strategy equilibrium in Milgrom and Weber (1985), this payoff
function is assumed to depend only on T0 and Ti, i.e., ui = ui(a, t0, ti).
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definitions of purification appeared in the previous literature. This section attempts
to find such a strong purification for every mixed strategy in our game model and
check the existence of pure strategy equilibria for the game.
To obtain a strong purification for our game, we also need the following conditions:
(C3) For each player i, her action space Ai is a finite set.
(C4) The players’ strategy-relevant private information is diffuse; that is, the
marginal measure τi on (Ti,Ti) is atomless for each player i.
Furthermore, we divide the payoff-relevant common information into two types.
The first-type common information, denoted by a measurable space (S ′0,S
′
0), rep-
resents the common information that is dependent on the strategy-relevant private
information. The second-type common information, denoted by (S ′′0 ,S
′′
0 ), is in-
dependent of the strategy-relevant private information. Thus, S0 = S
′
0 × S ′′0 and
S0 := S ′0 ⊗S ′′0 . We say that the first-type common information is finite if S ′0 is
a finite set and S ′0 is its power set.
Let S ′0 = {s′0q : q ∈ Q} be a finite set. For each given t0k ∈ T0 and s′0q ∈ S ′0, let





j=1(Tj ⊗Sj)). For each player i = 1, . . . , n, let ρkqi be the marginal









marginal of ηkq on (S ′′0 × Si × Ti,S ′′0 ⊗Si ⊗ Ti) and τ kqi the marginal of ηkq on
(Ti,Ti).
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(C ′2) The first-type common information is finite and each player’s private in-
formation is conditionally independent of all other players’ strategy-relevant pri-





j for all i, k and q.
Remark 3. The motivation of the division of the common information is that we
notice that in some cases, the common information and the strategy-relevant pri-
vate information may be independent of each other,4 but in some other cases, they
may not. As we can see later, these two types of information play different roles in
our game model. Particularly, the second-type common information is allowed to
be any measurable space because of its independence while the first-type common
information is restricted to be a finite set. It is also clear that upon this subdi-
vision, the payoff-relevant common information considered in Fu et al. (2007a) is
simply the first-type common information here.
Now we define the concept of strong purification for our game model.
Definition 2. A pure strategy profile g∗ = {g∗i }ni=1 is said to be a strong purification
of the mixed strategy profile g = {gi}ni=1 if the following conditions are satisfied
for each player i.
(1) Ui(g
∗) = Ui(g).
4In the example mentioned in Section 3.1, if the payoff-relevant common information is the
income tax rate and the strategy-relevant private information is something only affects the gross
income, then they are independent.
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(2) for any mixed strategy g′i ∈ Meas(T0 × Ti,M(Ai)), Ui(g′i, g−i) = Ui(g′i, g∗−i).
(3) given any t0k ∈ T0 and s0q ∈ S ′0, g∗i and gi have the same conditional











for all B ⊆ Ai, where gk∗i = g∗i (t0k, ·) ∈ Meas(Ti, Ai).
(4) for all k and q, g∗i (t0k, ti) ∈ supp gi(t0k, ti)5 for τ kqi almost all ti ∈ Ti.
Remark 4. From the above definition, it is easy to check that if two strategy profiles
satisfy item (1) and (2) and one is an equilibrium of the game Γ, then so is the
other.
Theorem 3. Suppose that (C1), (C
′
2), (C3) and (C4) hold. Then there exists a
strong purification for every mixed strategy in the game Γ.
By Theorems 2 and 3, the following result which shows the existence of a
pure strategy equilibrium for our game is obtained by showing that condition (C ′2)
implies (C2).
Corollary 1. Suppose that (C1), (C
′
2), (C3) and (C4) hold. Then there exists a
pure-strategy equilibrium for the game Γ.
Remark 5. In Fu et al. (2007a), the public and the common information spaces
are both finite sets. Thus, Corollary 1 generalizes their result to the case that
the public information space is allowed to be countable. Furthermore, we divide
5For any µ ∈M(Ai), suppµ is the support of µ, i.e., the complement of the union of all open
µ-null subsets of Ai.
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the common information into two types so that the first-type common information
space is finite and the second-type common information space is any arbitrary
measurable space.6 Therefore, the existence results of pure-strategy equilibria in
Radner and Rosenthal (1982), Milgrom and Weber (1985) and Fu et al. (2007a)
can all be regarded as special cases of our Corollary 1.
For a game with private information, Khan et al. (1999) shows that if the play-
ers’ strategy-relevant private information spaces are Lebesgue measure spaces and
the players’ action spaces are uncountable, then pure-strategy equilibria may not
exist; Loeb and Sun (2006) shows that if the players’ strategy-relevant private in-
formation spaces are Loeb measure spaces and their action spaces are compact
metric spaces (may be uncountable), then pure-strategy equilibria exist for the
game. Since our game model is a generalization to games with private informa-
tion, we leave it to the reader to verify that the above two results also hold for our
game model.
6Although the second-type common information can also be viewed as a component of the
payoff-relevant private information in the model of Fu et al. (2007a), we consider this subdivision
to be necessary since it is more compatible to the definition of common information.
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3.5 Appendix
3.5.1 Proof of Theorem 2
Notice that A is a compact matric space and ui(a, s0, si) is B(A)⊗F -measurable,
continuous on A for each (s0, si) ∈ S0 × Si and uniformly summable (i.e., satisfies
(C1) (iii)). Thus, we can apply Theorem 2.1 and Theorem 2.2 in Dynkin and Evstigneev
(1976) to assert the existence of a regular conditional expectation of ui(a, s0, si),
denoted by vi(a, t0, t), such that
(i) vi(a, t0, t) is B(A)⊗ T˜ -measurable;
(ii) |vi| ≤ ψi on T˜ × A for some ψi ∈ L1(T˜ , T˜ , τ˜);
(iii) vi(a, t0, t) is continuous on A for almost all (t0, t) ∈ T˜ ;
(iv) for all a ∈ A and any D ∈ T˜ ,
∫
{ω∈Ω:ϕ(ω)∈D}
ui(a, s0, si)dη =
∫
{(t0,t)∈D}
vi(a, t0, t)dτ˜ ,
where ϕ : Ω→ T˜ is the projection mapping from Ω to T˜ .
For each given t0k ∈ T0, let τ k denote the conditional probability measure of τ˜
on the space (T,T )7 and τ ki the marginal of τ
k on the space (Ti,Ti). For simplicity,
7Such a conditional probability measure always exists since T0 is countable.
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vi(a, t0k, t)g1(t0k, t1; da1) . . . gn(t0k, tn; dan)dτ
k. (3.1)
For all k ∈ K, let vki (a, t) := vi(a, t0k, t), gki (ti; dai) := gi(t0k, ti; dai) and
Eki (g
k













Now fix any k ∈ K. By the properties of vi(a, t0, ti) we’ve just shown, it is
straight-forward to check that the following condition holds:
(D1) each payoff function v
k
i satisfies
(i) vki is B(A)⊗T -measurable on A× T ,
(ii) vki (·, t) is continuous on A for every t ∈ T ,
(iii) |vki | ≤ ψki on A× T for some ψki ∈ L1(T,T , τ k).
Since τ is absolute continuous with respect to
∏n





(D2) For each k ∈ K, τ k is absolute continuous with respect to
∏n
i=1 τi.
Thus, under conditions (D1) and (D2) and the fact that {Ai}ni=1 are compact
metric spaces, we can apply Theorem 3.1 in Balder (1988) to obtain a mixed
strategy gk∗i ∈ Meas(Ti,M(Ai)) such that for i = 1, . . . , n:
Eki (g
k∗
1 , . . . , g
k∗
n ) ≥ Eki (gk∗1 , . . . , gk∗i−1, gki , gk∗i+1, . . . , gk∗n ) (3.3)
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for all gki ∈ Meas(Ti,M(Ai)).
Note that the above result holds for all k ∈ K. Thus we can define a mixed
strategy for each player i by letting g∗i (t0k, ti) = g
k∗
i (ti) for all t0k ∈ T0. Then by
Equations (3.1) and (3.3), we have that
Ui(g
∗


































i+1, . . . , g
∗
n),
for all gki ∈ Meas(Ti,M(Ai)) and hence all gi ∈ Meas(T0 × Ti,M(Ai)).
Thus (g∗1, . . . , g
∗
n) is a mixed strategy equilibrium and we are done! Q.E.D.
3.5.2 Proof of Theorem 3
To prove Theorem 3, we need to use the following result from Khan et al. (2006).
Lemma 4. (Khan et al., 2006, Corollary 1) Let (X,X ) be a measurable space; µk,
k = 1, . . . ,m, atomless probability measures on (X,X ); Y a finite set represented
as {y1, . . . , yn}; wj, j = 1, . . . , l, elements of Meas(X × Y,R) that are integrable
with respect to each µk; and g ∈ Meas(X,M(Y )). Let g(x;S) represent the value
of the probability measure g(x) at S ⊆ Y and g(x; dy) the integration operator with
respect to it. Then there exists g∗ ∈ Meas(X,Y ) such that for all k = 1, . . . ,m,














3. g∗(x) ∈ {yi ∈ Y : g(x; {yi}) > 0} ≡ supp g(x) for µk-almost all x ∈ X.
Proof of Theorem 3. Let the marginal of η on (T0×S ′0,T0⊗S ′0) be denoted
by η0. For simplicity, we denote η0({t0k, s′0q}) by βkq. Recall that the marginal
measure τi of η on the space (Ti, Ti) is atomless. This implies that if βkq > 0, τ kqi
is also atomless. When βkq = 0, we can redefine τ
kq
i to be τi without changing
anything. Thus, we can assume that τ kqi is also atomless for each k ∈ K and each





















































































τ kqj . (3.5)
By Fubini’s theorem, vgikq(ai, s
′′
0, si) is integrable on (Ai × S ′′0 × Si × Ti,R). For
j = 1, . . . , n, denote the measure
∫
Tj
gj(t0k, tj; ·)dτ kqj on Aj by γgjjkq. Then, (3.5)















For each k ∈ K, let gki (ti; dai) := gi(t0k, ti; dai). Since Ai is finite, we can choose
wgikq(ai, ti) ∈ Meas(Ai × Ti,R) such that wgikq(ai, ti) is the conditional expectation
E[vgikq(ai, s
′′














































Now fix any player i = 1, . . . , n and any k ∈ K and apply Corollary 4 to the
collection
{(Ti,Ti), {τ kqi }q∈Q, Ai, {wgikq}q∈Q, gki }





























(iii). gk∗i (ti) ∈ supp gi(t0k, ti) for τ kqi -almost all ti ∈ Ti.
Since our i and k were chosen arbitrarily, the above arguments hold for all
i = 1, . . . , n and k ∈ K. Let g∗i : T0× Ti → Ai be defined by g∗i (t0k, ti) = gk∗i (ti) for
all k ∈ K and let g∗ = (g∗1, . . . , g∗n). Then (ii) and (iii) above imply that the pure
strategy profile g∗ satisfies items (3) and (4) in Definition 3 of a strong purification
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for g. Now, we only need to show that g∗ and g also satisfy items (1) and (2) in
that definition.
To see this, consider any mixed strategy g′i ∈ Meas(T0 × Ti,M(Ai)). Denote
(g′i, g−i) by g
′ and (g′i, g
∗
−i) by g
′∗. By Equation (3.8), the expected payoffs of player









































































jkq(aj) for all j 6= i and all k and q. Therefore, vg
′∗
ikq(·, ·) =
vg∗ikq(·, ·) = vgikq(·, ·) = vg
′
ikq(·, ·) for all i, k and q. Hence, wg
′∗
ikq(·, ·) = wg
∗
ikq(·, ·) =
wgikq(·, ·) = wg
′
ikq(·, ·) for all i, k and q. By Equations (3.9) and (3.10), we have
Ui(g































∗) = Ui(g) by Equation (3.8) and (i) above. Since the above arguments
hold for any player i, items (1) and (2) in Definition 3 are also satisfied. It is thus
clear that g∗ is a strong purification of g. Q.E.D.
3.5.3 Proof of Corollary 1
By Theorems 2 and 3, it is clear that we need only to show that condition (C ′2)
implies (C2). To see this, let the marginal of η on (T0 × S ′0,T0 ⊗S ′0) be denoted
by η0. For simplicity, we denote η0({t0k, s′0q}) by βkq. Let νkq be the marginal






condition (C ′2) implies that all players’ strategy-relevant private information spaces




Now supposeD is a set inT such that (
∏n






































Since βkq ≥ 0 and νkq(D) ≥ 0 for all k and q, βnkqνkq(D) must be zero for all k and





kq(D) = 0, ie, (C2) holds. Q.E.D.
Chapter 4
Characterizing pure-strategy equilibria in
large games1
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we consider a generalized large game model where the agent space
is divided into countable (finite or countably infinite) different subgroups and each
player’s payoff depends on her own action and the action distribution in each of
the subgroups.2 In such a large game, a pure-strategy action profile that assigns an
action to each player is called a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium if no player has the
incentive to deviate. A distribution vector which records the action distributions
of all subgroups is called a pure-strategy equilibrium distribution if it is induced by
1This chapter is based on the joint work of Fu et al. (2007b)
2The large game discussed here is a generalization to the large non-anonymous games discussed
in Khan and Sun (2002) (Section 3).
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a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of the game.
Previous studies on large games mainly focus on the existence or nonexistence
of the Nash equilibria.3 But very few studies pay attention to the characteriza-
tion of the Nash equilibria, or equivalently, the equilibrium distributions. This
chapter aims to make some contributions in filling this gap, that is, we hope to
find some good characterization results which may broaden our understanding of
the equilibria and also provide practical and useful guidance in determining the
equilibria. In particular, this chapter presents three characterization results and a
counterexample for the equilibrium distributions in large games.
Our first result characterizes the equilibrium distributions in large games with
countable actions. We show that a distribution vector on the action space is an
equilibrium distribution if and only if for any (finite) subset C of actions, there are,
in each subgroup, more players having a best response in C than playing actions
in C.
Our second result studies large games with countable homogeneous groups of
players, where the homogeneousness assumption means that the players in each
subgroup share a common payoff function and a common action set. Our third
result is for large games endowed with atomless Loeb agent spaces. These two
results are in the same form which also parallels the first result. Both of the
results show that a given distribution vector is an equilibrium distribution if and
3For a detailed survey, see also Khan and Sun (2002)
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only if for any Borel [open or closed] subset C of actions more players in each
subgroup have a best response in C than play actions in C.
Next we show through a simple counterexample that if both actions and payoffs
are uncountable and the agent space is a general probability space, say the Lebesgue
unit interval, then a similar characterization result does not hold anymore for such
a large game.
The proof of our first result uses Bollobas and Varopoulos (1974)’s extension of
the famous marriage theorem (or the Hall’s theorem) and the proof of the third re-
sult relies on Sun (1996)’s result on the distributional properties of correspondence
on Loeb spaces.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 introduces the game model and
Section 4.3 presents three characterization results for three settings of large games.
Section 4.4 gives a counterexample showing that such a characterization result fails
in a more general setting. Section 4.5 contains some concluding remarks and all
the proofs are given in Section 4.6.
4.2 The model
Let (T,T , λ) be an atomless probability space of agents and I a countable (finite
or countably infinite) index set. Let (Ti)i∈I be a measurable partition of T with
positive λ-measures (αi)i∈I . For each i ∈ I, let λi be the probability measure on
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Ti such that for any measurable set B ⊆ Ti, λi(B) = λ(B)/αi.
Let A be a Polish space4 of actions, B(A) the Borel σ-algebra of A, M (A)
the set of all Borel probability measures on A, endowed with the topology of weak
convergence of measures, and M (A)I the product space of |I| copies of M (A),
endowed with the usual product topology. Suppose that each player t ∈ T chooses
her own action from an action set K(t) ∈ A, where K : T → A is a compact
valued measurable correspondence. Since A is Polish, M (A) is Polish5 and hence
A×M (A)I is also Polish. For easy notation, we now let Ω := A×M (A)I .
Unless otherwise specified, any topological space discussed in this chapter is
tacitly understood to be equipped with its Borel σ-algebra, i.e., the σ-algebra
generated by the family of open sets, and the measurability is defined in terms of
it.
Definition 3. A large game is a Carathe´odory function6 U : T × Ω → R such
that for each ω ∈ Ω, the function Uω = U(·, ω) : T → R is measurable and for
each t ∈ T , the function Ut = U(t, ·) : Ω → R is continuous. A measurable
function f : T → A is called a pure-strategy profile if f(t) ∈ K(t) for all t ∈ T . A
4A Polish space is a topological space homeomorphic to some complete separable metric space.
5See, eg, Theorem 14.15 in Aliprantis and Border (1999).
6A large game is also often defined to be a measurable function from T to the space of payoff
functions, which is the space of all continuous real-valued functions on Ω here. Since such a
measurable function can always be transformed to be a Carathe´odory function, our definition
here is more general.
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pure-strategy profile f is called a (pure-strategy) Nash equilibrium7 if
U [t, f(t), (λif
−1
i )i∈I ] ≥ U [t, a, (λif−1i )i∈I ] for all a ∈ K(t) and all t ∈ T,
where fi is the restriction of f to Ti and λif
−1
i the induced distribution on A. A
distribution vector µ inM (A)I is called a (pure-strategy) equilibrium distribution8
if µ = (λif
−1
i )i∈I for some Nash equilibrium f .
Recall that a correspondence F from T to A is said to be measurable if for each
closed subset C of A, the set F−1(C) = {t ∈ T : F (t) ∩ C 6= ∅} is measurable
in T . A function f from T to A is said to be a measurable selection of F if f is
measurable and f(t) ∈ F (t) for all t ∈ T . When F is measurable and closed valued,
the classical Kuratowski-Ryll-Nardzewski Theorem (see, eg, Aliprantis and Border
(1999, p.567)) shows that F has a measurable selection.
Given µ ∈ M (A)I , let Bµ(t) = argmaxa∈K(t) U(t, a, µ) be the set of best re-
sponses for player t given action distribution µ. By the Measurable Maximum The-
orem in Aliprantis and Border (1999, p.570), Bµ is a measurable correspondence
from T to A, has nonempty compact values and admits a measurable selection. Let
Bµi : Ti ³ A be the restriction of Bµ to Ti. It is straightforward to check that µ is
an equilibrium distribution if and only if for each i ∈ I there exists a measurable
selection fi of B
µ
i such that µ = (λif
−1
i )i∈I .
7Throughout this chapter, we deal only with pure-strategy Nash equilibrium and pure-strategy
equilibrium distribution. Thus we suppress the adjective ‘pure-strategy’ hereafter.
8More precisely, µ should be called an equilibrium distribution vector.
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4.3 The results
Our first result is for large games with countable actions and is formulated as
follows.
Theorem 4. In a large game U , if the action space A is a countable and complete
metric space, then the following statements are equivalent:
(i) µ = (µi)i∈I ∈M (A)I is an equilibrium distribution;
(ii) for each i ∈ I, µi(C) ≤ λi[(Bµi )−1(C)] for every subset C in A;
(iii) for each i ∈ I, µi(D) ≤ λi[(Bµi )−1(D)] for every finite set D in A.
Literally, the above theorem says that a distribution vector on the action space
is an equilibrium distribution if and only if for any subset or any finite subset C
of the actions, there are less players in each group playing the actions in C than
having a best response in C.9 The special case that |I| = 1 and A is finite in
Theorem 4 is the main result in Blonski (2005).
Our next result considers a situation where all the players in each group are
homogeneous, that is, all the players in each subgroup share a common payoff
function and a common action set. Before we state our result, let’s define the
concept of homogeneousness.
9If µ is an equilibrium distribution, then µi(C) = λi(f−1i (C)) = λi{t ∈ Ti : fi(t) ∈ C}, where
fi ∈ Bµi , is the proportion of players playing the actions in C.
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Definition 4. A large game U is said to have countable homogeneous groups of
players if for each group i ∈ I, Ut and K(t) do not change for all t ∈ Ti.
Theorem 5. If a large game U has countable homogeneous groups of players, then
the following statements are equivalent:
(i) µ = (µi)i∈I ∈M (A)I is an equilibrium distribution;
(ii) for each i ∈ I, µi(C) ≤ λi[(Bµi )−1(C)] for every Borel set C in A;
(iii) for each i ∈ I, µi(F ) ≤ λi[(Bµi )−1(F )] for every closed set F in A;
(iv) for each i ∈ I, µi(O) ≤ λi[(Bµi )−1(O)] for every open set O in A.
Clearly, the homogeneousness assumption also implies that there are totally
countably many payoffs in the game. Thus both Theorem 1 and 2 adopt a count-
ability restriction which is either on the action space or on the payoff space. Our
third result shows that if we replace the usual agent space by an atomless Loeb
probability space,10 then we can remove all the countability restrictions.
Theorem 6. If the agent space (T,T , λ) of a large game U is an atomless Loeb
probability space, then the result in Theorem 5 is still valid.
This result is shown by applying a proposition on the distributional properties
of correspondences on Loeb spaces from Sun (1996).
10The usage of hyperfinite Loeb spaces in modeling large games is systematically studied in
Khan and Sun (1996, 1999). For more information about Loeb spaces, see also Loeb and Wolff
(2000).
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Both Theorems 5 and 6 implies that a given distribution vector is an equilibrium
distribution if and only if for any Borel [open or closed] subset C of actions more
players in each subgroup have a best response in C than play actions in C.
4.4 A counterexample
The previous section presents characterization results for large games restricted by
the countability assumption on the action or payoff space or the Loeb assumption
on the agent space. It would be good if we can obtain a similar characterization
result for a general game without the above restrictions. However, as we can
see from the example below, a similar characterization result does not hold for a
general large game endowed with uncountable actions, uncountable payoffs and a
Lebesgue measure space of agents. For simplicity, we only need to consider a case
where there is no partition on the agent space.
Example 2. Consider a large game U in which the space of players is the Lebesgue
unit interval T = [0, 1] with the Lebesgue measure denoted by λ, the action set A
is the interval [−1, 1] and the payoffs are given by U(t, a, µ) = −|t − |a||11 where
t ∈ T , a ∈ A and µ ∈M (A), which, obviously, is a Carathe´odory function.
Let the uniform distribution on [−1, 1] be denoted by η. Thus, given η, the
11This payoff function is similar to a payoff function used in Khan et al. (1997).
4.4 A counterexample 52
best response set for player t is:
Bη(t) = argmaxU(t, a, η) = {t,−t}.
Let C be any Borel set in A and define C1 = C ∩ (0, 1] and C2 = C ∩ [−1, 0].
Then
λ[(Bη)−1(C)] = λ({t ∈ T : Bη(t) ∩ C 6= ∅})
= λ{t ∈ T : t ∈ C1 or − t ∈ C2}
≥ max{λ(C1), λ(C2)}
≥ λ(C1) + λ(C2)
2
.











Now we shall prove by contradiction that η can not be an equilibrium distribu-
tion.
Suppose η is an equilibrium distribution. Then, by definition, there exists a
measurable selection f of Bη such that λf−1 = η and f(t) ∈ Bη(t) for all t ∈ T .
Let D = f−1((0, 1]). Then
f(t) =

t, t ∈ D
−t, t /∈ D.
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Note that f−1(D) = {t : f(t) ∈ D} = {t : t ∈ D} = D. Hence, λ(D) = λf−1(D) =
η(D) = λ(D)
2
, which is a contradiction. Therefore, η cannot be an equilibrium
distribution. ¥
4.5 Concluding remarks
The three characterization results presented in this chapter are all in the same
form and the characterizing counterparts are easy to understand. Therefore these
results could be served as a practical tool to determine the pure-strategy Nash
equilibria, and they also provide an alternative way of showing the existence of
Nash equilibria by showing the existence of their characterizing counterparts. The
counterexample shows that our characterization results are actually quite sharp.
4.6 Proofs
4.6.1 Proof of Theorem 4
To prove this theorem, we need the following lemma from Bollobas and Varopoulos
(1974), which is an extension of the famous marriage theorem.
Lemma 5 (Bollobas and Varopoulos (1974)). Let (T, T , λ) be an atomless prob-
ability space, I a countable index set, (Ti)i∈I a family of sets in T , and (αi)i∈I a






i∈D αi for all finite subsets D of I;
(ii) there is a family (Si)i∈I of sets in T such that for all i, j ∈ I, i 6= j, one has
Si ⊆ Ti, λ(Si) = αi and Si ∩ Sj = ∅.
Proof of Theorem 4 For (i)⇒(ii), let µ be an equilibrium distribution. Then
by definition, there exists a Nash equilibrium f : T → A such that µ = ((λif−1i )i∈I).
Notice that for each i ∈ I, fi(t) ∈ Bµi (t) for all t ∈ Ti. Thus, for any i ∈ I and for
every C ⊆ A,
µi(C) = λi(f
−1
i (C)) = λi({t ∈ Ti : fi(t) ∈ C})
≤ λi({t ∈ Ti : Bµi (t) ∩ C 6= ∅}) = λi[(Bµi )−1(C)].
It is clear that (ii) ⇒ (iii).
It remains to prove (iii)⇒(i). To see this, fix any i ∈ I. Let A := {aj}j∈N. For
each j ∈ N, let βj = µi({aj}) and T ji := (Bµi )−1({aj}) = {t ∈ Ti : aj ∈ Bµi (t)}. Let







By assumption, we have
∑






i ). Thus we can
apply Lemma 5 to assert that there exist, for all j ∈ N, Sj ⊆ T ji such that
λi(Sj) = βj and Sj ∩ Sk = ∅ for all k 6= j.
Now we define a measurable function hi : Ti → A such that for all j ∈ N and for
all t ∈ Sj, hi(t) = aj. Since, for any j ∈ N, t ∈ Sj implies that aj ∈ (Bµi )(t), we have
hi(t) ∈ Bµi (t) for all t ∈ T . Furthermore, λi(h−1i ({aj})) = λi(Sj) = βj = µi({aj})
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for all j ∈ N, which implies λih−1i = µi. Repeat the above arguments for all i ∈ I
and define a measurable function h : T → A by letting h(t) = hi(t) if t ∈ Ti. Thus
it is clear that h is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium and µ = (µi)i∈N = (λih−1i )i∈N
is the equilibrium distribution induced by h. ¥
4.6.2 Proof of Theorem 5
To prove this theorem, we need to use the following lemma which is well know in
this field and can be obtained by appropriately adjusting the proof of Theorem
3.11 in Skorokhod (1956).
Lemma 6. (Skorokhod, 1956, Theorem 3.11) Let (T, T , λ) be an atomless proba-
bility space and A a Polish space. Then for any ν ∈M (A) there exists a measurable
function f : T → A such that λf−1 = ν.
Proof of Theorem 5. Let µ = (µi)i∈I be an element ofM (A)I . Firstly, we
need to show that for each i ∈ I and every C ∈ B(A), (Bµi )−1(C) is measurable.
To see this, fix any i ∈ I. The fact that Ut and K(t) do not change for all t ∈ Ti
implies that Bµi (t) also does not change for all t ∈ Ti. Thus we can let Ci := Bµi (t)
for all t ∈ Ti. Then, for any C ∈ B(A), we have
(Bµi )
−1(C) = {t ∈ Ti : Bµi (t) ∩ C 6= ∅} =





To see (i)⇒(ii), let µ = (µi)i∈I be an equilibrium distribution. By assumption,
there exists a Nash equilibrium f : T → A such that µ = (λif−1i )i∈I ∈M (A)I and
f(t) ∈ Bµ(t) for all t ∈ T . Therefore, for any C ∈ B(A),
µi(C) = λif
−1
i (C) = λi({t ∈ Ti : fi(t) ∈ C})





It is clear that (ii) ⇒ (iii).
To see (iii) ⇒ (iv), let O be an open set in A. Then there is an increas-
ing sequence {Fn}∞n=1 of closed sets in A such that O =
∞⋃
n=1
Fn. For each n, we
have (Bµi )




−1(O)]. Thus, µi(O) ≤ λi[(Bµi )−1(O)].
It remains to show (iv) ⇒ (i).
Recall that for all i ∈ I, the set Ci := Bµi (t) for any t ∈ Ti is compact and hence
also complete and separable. Fix any i ∈ N. By the fact that the set (A − Ci) is
open, we have that
1− µi(Ci) = µi(A− Ci) ≤ λi[(Bµi )−1(A− Ci)] = 0, (4.1)
which gives µi(Ci) = 1 for all i. Therefore, by Lemma 6, there exists a measurable
function fi : Ti → Ci such that µi = λifi−1. By definition, fi ∈ Bµi .
Define f : T → A by letting f(t) = fi(t) for all t ∈ Ti and all i ∈ I. Thus
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f is a measurable selection of Bµ and µ = (µi)i∈I = (λif−1i )i∈I is an equilibrium
distribution. ¥
4.6.3 Proof of Theorem 6
To prove this theorem, we need to use the following lemma in Sun (1996).
Lemma 7. (Sun, 1996, Proposition 3.5) Let Γ be a closed valued measurable
correspondence from an atomless Loeb probability space (Ω,F , P ) to a Polish space
X. Let ν be a Borel probability measure on X. Then the following are equivalent:
(i) there is a measurable selection f of Γ such that Pf−1 = ν;
(ii) for every Borel set C in X, ν(C) ≤ P (Γ−1(C));
(iii) for every closed set F in X, ν(F ) ≤ P (Γ−1(F ));
(iv) for every open set O in X, ν(O) ≤ P (Γ−1(O)).
Proof of Theorem 6. For any i ∈ I, notice that Bµi is a compact valued (and
hence closed valued) measurable correspondence from an atomless Loeb probability
space (Ti,Ti, λi) to the Polish space A. Thus, by applying Proposition 3.5 in Sun
(1996) to Bµi , we see that µi = λif
−1
i for some fi being a measurable selection of B
µ
i
if and only if for every Borel (closed, or open) set H in A, µi(H) ≤ λi[(Bµi )−1(H)].
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Since the above result holds for all i ∈ I, thus µ = (µi)i∈I is an equilibrium
distribution if and only if for each i ∈ I and every Borel (closed, or open) set H in
A, µi(H) ≤ λi[(Bµi )−1(H)]. ¥
Chapter 5
From large games to Bayesian games:
connection and generalization
5.1 Introduction
Large games and Bayesian games are two important areas in game theory. They
were introduced into the study of game theory for different purposes and have been
developing along their own lines. (For more detailed introductions on large games
and Bayesian games, see, for example, Khan and Sun (2002) and Milgrom and Weber
(1985).) Although it has long been noted that there exist some symmetric prop-
erties between large games and Bayesian games,1 no formal connection has been
1For example, Mas-colell (1984) had suggested in his Remarks that his results in large games
might be applied to Bayesian games with finite players, and Khan and Sun (1995, 1999) presented




established between them and they are still regarded as two separate types of games
without any direct links. In this chapter, we shall challenge this view by showing
that any Bayesian game can induce a large game and the two games are equivalent
on the existence of pure strategy equilibria. Based on this connection and some
new existence results on large games, we also seek to further the theory on the
existence of pure strategy equilibria for Bayesian games.
A large game discussed here is a game endowed with a separate atomless prob-
ability space of agents.2 For such a game, we further divide its agent space into
countable (finite or countably infinite) groups and assume that each player’s payoff
depends on her own action and the distribution of actions in each of the groups.
We also assume that the action space for the game is a Polish space and all the
players in each group share a common compact action subset in that action space.
Under such a framework, Fu et al. (2007b)3 presented three characterization re-
sults for the pure strategy (Nash) equilibria in three different settings of large
games, namely (a) large games with a countable Polish space of actions, (b) large
games with countable homogeneous groups of players4 and (c) large games with
an atomless Loeb probability space of agents.
2Such a game is called a large non-anonymous game by some authors (see, eg, Khan and Sun
(2002)).
3The game model in Fu et al. (2007b) is slightly more general. See footnote 11.
4The homogeneity assumption here means that all the players in each group share a common
payoff function.
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We notice that the three characterization results in Fu et al. (2007b) are actu-
ally in the same pattern. In particular, the pure strategy equilibria in the three
settings can actually be characterized by a common generalized counterpart. Thus
by showing the existence of this common characterizing counterpart, we obtain the
existence of pure strategy equilibria in the three settings of large games mentioned
above. Our existence results for cases (a) and (c) generalize the corresponding
results in Khan and Sun (1995, 1999)5 and our result for case (b) is new.
Next we turn our attention to the relationship between large games and Bayesian
games. By assuming the regularity conditions of the diffuseness and independence
of private information in Bayesian games,6 we show that each Bayesian game can
induce a generic large game such that the former has a pure strategy (Bayesian
Nash) equilibrium if and only if the later has a pure strategy (Nash) equilibrium.
This result breaks down the wall between Bayesian games and large games and it
enables us to apply the existence results of large games to Bayesian games.
Under our framework, the countable partition of the agent space in large games
now corresponds to the setting of countably many players in Bayesian games. This
setting generalizes the game model considered in Khan and Sun (1995, 1999) where
only a finite set of players is involved.7 By applying the existence results of large
5In the framework of Khan and Sun (1995, 1999), the action space is assumed to be a compact
metric space and the agent space is divided into finite groups with each player’s payoff depending
on her own action and the distribution of actions in each of the groups.
6The regularity conditions of diffuseness and independence of private information are com-
monly used in studying pure strategy equilibria in Bayesian games. See also Milgrom and Weber
(1981); Radner and Rosenthal (1982); Milgrom and Weber (1985); Khan and Sun (1995, 1999).
7In a setting where the information structure is simpler and the action space is some
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games to Bayesian games, we show that a Bayesian game with countable players
has a pure strategy equilibrium if it satisfies the regularity conditions as well as
one of the following four conditions: (i) it has only countable actions; (ii) it’s agent
space is an atomless Loeb space; (iii) each player’s strategy-relevant information
and payoff-relevant information are independent of each other; or (iv) each player’s
payoff-relevant information is countable. Our cases (i) and (ii) here correspond to
the cases (a) and (c) in large games respectively, and the existence results based on
them generalize the corresponding results in Khan and Sun (1995, 1999). Our cases
(iii) and (iv) are derived from case (b) in large games and to my best knowledge,
they have not been reported anywhere in the existing literature.
By using the similar techniques, we also study a generalized Bayesian game
model introduced by Fu et al. (2007a), which includes a new type of information,
the so-called ‘public information’, that is to be publicly announced to all players
and will affect all player’s strategies.8 Furthermore, this game model also includes
a payoff-relevant common information which influences all player’s payoffs. Thus
it can be regarded as a useful generalization to Bayesian games. This game model
was later studied further by Loeb and Sun (2007) on the case of Loeb agent space
and by Fu (2007) on mixed strategy equilibria and strong purification.
compact and convex subset of a separable Banach space, Yannelis and Rustichini (1991) and
Kim and Yannelis (1997) also show the existence of an equilibrium for Bayesian games with in-
finite players. See also Yannelis (2007) for a recent generalization of the above results to the
Debreu’s social system.
8For a detailed introduction and justification of the ‘public information’, please see the intro-
duction section in Fu (2007).
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For such a game with both private and public information, by following the
same idea of connecting it with large games, we show that there exists a pure
strategy equilibrium if the game satisfies one of the four similar conditions as those
in Bayesian games discussed above. This unified result thus not only covers and
improves the existing results in Fu et al. (2007a); Fu (2007); Loeb and Sun (2007)
but also introduces novel cases that have not been discussed yet.
Although we present quite a few results regarding the large games and Bayesian
games in this chapter, the proofs are actually quite short due to our unified ap-
proach and the established connections among them. The ideas and methods
adopted in this chapter may also be applied to other aspects of these games and
lead to new findings.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 deals with large games and
shows the existence of pure strategy equilibria in three settings of large games by
showing the existence of their generalized characterizing counterpart. Section 5.3
establishes the connection between large games and Bayesian games and shows the
existence of pure strategy equilibria in four settings of Bayesian games. Section 5.4
shows the existence of pure strategy equilibria in four types of generalized Bayesian
games with private and public information. Section 5.5 contains some concluding
remarks. For ease reading, except for a few short ones, all the main proofs are put
in Section 5.6.
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5.2 Large Games
5.2.1 Game model
Let (T,T , λ) be a probability space of players. Without loss of generality, we also
assume that (T,T , λ) is complete.9 Let I be a countable (i.e., finite or countably
infinite) index set with |I| its cardinality. If I is countably infinite, we shall just let
I = N, the set of all natural numbers. Let (Ti)i∈I be a measurable partition of T
such that λ(Ti) > 0 for all i ∈ I. For each i ∈ I, let λi be the probability measure
on Ti such that for any measurable set B ⊆ Ti, λi(B) = λ(B)/λ(Ti).
Let A be a Polish space10 of actions andB(A) the Borel σ-algebra of A. Assume
that all the players in each group i ∈ I choose their actions from a common
compact subset Ai of A. For easy notation, we define an action correspondence
K : T ³ A for all players such that K(t) = Ai if t ∈ Ti.11 Let M (Ai) be the
set of all Borel probability measures on Ai endowed with the topology of weak
convergence of probability measures and
∏
i∈IM (Ai) the product space endowed
with the product topology. For easy notation, we let Θ := A ×∏i∈IM (Ai) and
Θi := Ai ×
∏
i∈IM (Ai) for all i ∈ I. Obviously, Θ is a Polish space and for each
i ∈ I, Θi is a compact metric space.
9Recall that a probability space (T,T , λ) is complete if A ⊂ B, B ∈ T , and P (B) = 0
together imply that A ∈ T . Also recall that any probability space can be completed.
10A Polish space is a topological space homeomorphic to some complete and separable metric
space.
11This assumption is stronger than the one adopted in Fu et al. (2007b) where K(t) is only
assumed to be a compact valued measurable correspondence from T to A.
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Unless otherwise specified, any topological space discussed in this chapter is
tacitly understood to be equipped with its Borel σ-algebra, i.e., the σ-algebra
generated by the family of open sets, and the measurability is defined in terms of
it.
We assume that the payoff of each player depends on her action as well as on
the distribution of actions in each of the groups. Mathematically, we let the payoff
space, denoted by C(Θ), be the space of all continuous real-valued functions on Θ,
endowed with the topology of compact convergence.12 In the following context,
we reserve the notation C(X) for denoting the set of all continuous real-valued
functions on any topological space X.
Definition 5. (1) A semi-large game is a measurable mapping U from T to
C(Θ). A semi-large game U is called a large game if its agent space (T,T , λ)
is atomless.
(2) In a semi-large game U , a measurable function f : T → A is called a pure
strategy profile if f(t) ∈ K(t) for all t ∈ T . A pure strategy profile f is called
a pure strategy (Nash) equilibrium if for λ-almost all t ∈ T ,
U(t)[f(t), (λif
−1
i )i∈I ] ≥ U(t)[a, (λif−1i )i∈I ] for all a ∈ K(t),
where fi is the restriction of f to Ti. A distribution vector µ in
∏
i∈IM (Ai)
12The topology of compact convergence coincides with the compact open topology for C(Θ).
See Theorem 46.8 in Munkres (2000).
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is called an equilibrium distribution13 if µ = (λif
−1
i )i∈I for some pure strategy
equilibrium f .
(3) Given a semi-large game U and any µ ∈ ∏i∈IM (Ai), let Bµ : T ³ A be
the best-response correspondence, i.e., Bµ(t) = argmaxa∈K(t) U(t)(a, µ) for
all t ∈ T .
By the Measurable Maximum Theorem (see, eg, Aliprantis and Border (1999,
p.570)), Bµ is a measurable correspondence from T to A, has nonempty compact
values and admits a measurable selection. Recall that a correspondence F from
(T,T ) to A is said to be measurable if for each closed subset C of A, the set
F−1(C) = {t ∈ T : F (t) ∩ C 6= ∅} is measurable in T . A function f from T to
A is said to be a measurable selection of F if f is measurable and f(t) ∈ F (t) for
all t ∈ T . Since our agent space (T,T , λ) is assumed to be a complete probability
space, (Bµ)−1(E) is measurable for any Borel subset E of A.14
5.2.2 Pure-strategy equilibrium
To show the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium in our large game, we shall
use the characterization results presented in Fu et al. (2007b). In Fu et al. (2007b),
there are three separated characterization results for three different settings of large
games and each result contains several equivalent characterizing counterparts. Here
13To be more precise, µ may be called an equilibrium distribution vector.
14See, eg, Theorem III.30 in Castaing and Valadier (1977).
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we unify these three results into one and only list one of the common characterizing
counterparts. This abbreviated result is enough for our purpose of showing the
existence of equilibria.
Lemma 8. (Fu et al., 2007b, Theorem 1, 2 and 3) If a large game U satisfies one
of the following three conditions:
(i) the action space A is a countable Polish space;
(ii) all the players in each group share a common payoff;
(iii) the agent space (T,T , λ) is an atomless Loeb probability space,
then the following two statements are equivalent:
(iv) µ = (µi)i∈I ∈
∏
i∈IM (Ai) is an equilibrium distribution;
(v) for each i ∈ I, µi(E) ≤ λi[(Bµi )−1(E)] for every Borel subset E in A.15
Remark 6. Since a countable collection of countable sets is still countable, our
condition (ii) can be replaced by “(ii’) all the players in each group can have at
most countably many payoff functions.” Although condition (ii’) seems to be more
general than (ii), they are indeed equivalent.
The above lemma presents a unified characterizing counterpart for equilibrium
distributions in three settings of large games. The following result shows that this
unified characterizing counterpart does exist in a general sense.
15When A is countable, the ‘Borel subset’ here is understood to be any subset of A.
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Theorem 7. Given a semi-large game U , there exists a µ ∈∏i∈IM (Ai) such that
for each i ∈ I, µi(E) ≤ λi[(Bµi )−1(E)] for every Borel subset E in A.
Remark 7. Theorem 7 does not require game U to be ‘large’, nor does it require
the action or payoff space to be countable or the agent space to be Loeb. It has
been shown by Khan et al. (1997) (section 2) and Rath et al. (1995) (Example 3)
that when both the action and payoff spaces are uncountable and the agent space
is an atomless Lebesgue measure space, a pure strategy equilibrium may also not
exist for the large game. Thus this characterizing probability measure exists in a
more general situation than the pure strategy equilibria.
Combining Lemma 8 and Theorem 7, we directly obtain the existence result of
equilibrium distributions and hence also the existence of a pure strategy equilib-
rium.
Theorem 8. If a large game U also satisfies one of the following three conditions:
(i) the action space A is a countable Polish space;
(ii) all the players in each group share a common payoff;
(iii) the agent space (T,T , λ) is an atomless Loeb probability space,
then there exists a pure strategy equilibrium for the game.
Remark 8. By allowing |I| to be countably infinite and the action space A to be
Polish, cases (i) and (iii) in our Theorem 8 generalize respectively Theorem 10 in
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Khan and Sun (1995) and Theorem 1 in Khan and Sun (1999) where |I| is finite
and A is compact.
Remark 9. Our case (ii) is new. It is not difficult to understand that in reality,
people having certain common characteristics, say salary and sex, may share a
common (or a very similar) preference, i.e., payoff. Thus case (ii) can be quite
reasonable and useful. Actually, as we can see in the following sections, this result
also brings into attention some new existence results of pure strategy equilibria of
Bayesian games.16
Remark 10. Due to the generality of the characterizing probability measure, our
Theorem 8 is obtained easily. However, this is not the case if we want to prove
the existences of the above equilibria directly. Actually, the direct proofs for the
above three equilibria need to be constructed individually and each of them may
well involve a lot of effort. (see, eg, Khan and Sun (1995, 1999).)
5.3 Bayesian Games with countable players
In this section, we will establish a connection between Bayesian games and large
games on the existence of pure-strategy equilibria and by this connection, we will
show the existence of pure strategy equilibria in four different settings of Bayesian
16We also notice that Carmona (2008) shows the existence of equilibria in large games with
countable payoffs but without partition on the agent space. Actually, their result being based
on the main result of Mas-colell (1984) cannot accommodate any partition on the agent space.
Obviously, by Remark 6 their result can be regarded as a special case of our case (ii).
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games with countably many players.
5.3.1 Game model
Consider a Bayesian game Γ formulated as follows. The game has countably many
players i ∈ I, where I is the countable index set as defined in Section 5.2.17
The action set for each player i, denoted by Ai, is a compact subset of a Polish
space A. For each player i, a measurable space (Ti,Ti) represents her strategy-
relevant private information, and a measurable space (Si,Si) represents her payoff-





i∈I(Ti ⊗ Si)) equipped with a probability measure η constitutes the total
information space of the game.
Let Λ :=
∏
i∈I Ai denote the space of the players’ action profiles. For each
player i, her payoff function depends on the actions chosen by all the players and
her own payoff-relevant private information, i.e., it is a mapping ui : Λ× Si → R.
We assume that for each a = (ai)i∈I ∈ Λ,18 ui(a, ·) is Si-measurable, and for
each si ∈ Si, ui(·, si) is continuous on Λ. We also assume that ui satisfies the
uniform integrability condition, that is, there is a real-valued integrable function
ϕi on (Ω,F , η) such that |ui(a, si)| ≤ ϕi(si, s−i, (tj)j∈I) for all a ∈ Λ and all
17By allowing countably infinite many players, this game model generalizes the Bayesian
games with finite players discussed in Milgrom and Weber (1985), Radner and Rosenthal (1982),
Khan and Sun (1995) and Khan and Sun (1999).
18Please note that we use the boldface a to denote an action profile (a vector) from action
profile space Λ and the usual a a single action from the action space A.
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(si, s−i, (tj)j∈I) ∈ Ω, where s−i = (sj)j∈I,j 6=i.
For each i ∈ I, we shall also use the following (conventional) notation: A−i =∏
j∈I,j 6=iAj, T−i =
∏





j 6=i. We shall also use the notation Meas(X,Y )
to denote the space of all measurable mappings from X to Y .
Definition 6. (1) In the game Γ, a pure strategy for each player i is an element
of Meas(Ti, Ai), the space of all measurable mappings from Ti to Ai. A pure
strategy profile is a collection g = (gi)i∈I of pure strategies, which specifies a
pure strategy for each player.
(2) Given any pure strategy profile g = (gj)j∈I , the resulting expected payoff for
player i can be written as




A pure strategy profile g = (gj)j∈I is called a pure strategy (Bayesian Nash)
equilibrium of Γ if for each i ∈ I, Ei(gi, g−i) ≥ Ei(g′i, g−i) for all g′i ∈
Meas(Ti, Ai).





i∈I Ti⊗Si), νi the marginal of η on the space (Ti×Si,Ti⊗Si), τi
the marginal of η on Ti and δi the marginal of η on the space (Si,Si). We suppose
our game also satisfies the following condition:
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(C1) Each player’s private information is independent of all other players’
strategy-relevant private information, i.e., ρi = νi ×
∏
j 6=i τj for all i.
Now let g be a pure strategy profile of the game Γ. By condition (C1), the












5.3.2 Connecting Bayesian games with large games
By the uniform integrability condition of ui, we can apply Theorem 2.1 and
Theorem 2.2 in Dynkin and Evstigneev (1976) to assert the existence of a reg-
ular conditional expectation of ui(gi(ti), a−i, si), denoted by vi(gi(ti), a−i, ti) =
E{ui(gi(ti), a−i, si)|ti}, such that: (a) vi(gi(·), a−i, ·) is Ti-measurable for each
a−i ∈ A−i, (b) vi(gi(ti), ·, ti) is continuous on A−i for almost all ti ∈ Ti, (c) |vi| ≤ ψi
on Λ× Ti for some ψi ∈ L1(Ti,Ti, τi), and (d) for all a−i ∈ A−i,∫
Ti×Si
ui(gi(ti), a−i, si)dνi =
∫
Ti
vi(gi(ti), a−i, ti)dτi. (5.2)


























Gi(ti, gi(ti), (τjgj)j∈I)dτi, (5.3)
19By the Kolmogorov’s Consistence Theorem of marginal probability measures (see page 94 in




j , is always well defined.
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where Gi is a function from Ti × Ai ×
∏
j∈IM (Aj) to R such that







for any (µj)j∈I ∈
∏
j∈IM (Aj).
20 By the properties of vi, it is obvious that
given any ti ∈ Ti, Gi is continuous from Ai ×
∏
j∈IM (Aj) to R, and given any
(ai, (µj)j∈I) ∈ Ai ×
∏
j∈IM (Aj), Gi is measurable from Ti to R.21
Now for all i ∈ I, let Xi = Ti × i and Xi = Ti ⊗ i, and define a prob-
ability measure λi on (X,Xi) by letting λi(Bi × i) = τi(Bi) for any Bi ∈ Ti.
Clearly, (Xi,Xi, λi) is a well-defined probability space. Let X =
⋃
i∈I Xi and










λi(Xi ∩D) if I = N is countably infinite.
Lemma 9. (X,X , λ) is a probability space.
Proof. Observe that X ∈ X . Let D = ⋃i∈I Ci ∈ X . Then Dc = X − D =⋃
i∈I(Xi − Ci) ∈ X . It is also straightforward to check that X is closed under
countable union. Thus X is a σ-algebra. By the definition of λ, it is easy to see
that λ is a well-defined probability measure on X . ¥
By the definition of λi and λ, it is also easy to check that for each i ∈ I,
λ(Xi) > 0 and for any measurable set B ⊆ Xi, λi(B) = λ(B)/λ(Xi).
Then we can define the following game UΓ induced by the game Γ:
20Note that Gi actually does not depend on µi.
21For a detailed proof of this claim, see, eg, p648-649 in Khan and Sun (1995).
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(1) its agent space is (X,X , λ);
(2) (Xi)i∈I forms a partition on X and λ(Xi) > 0 for all i ∈ I;
(3) its action space is A which is a Polish space;
(4) all the players in each group i ∈ I play a common compact action subset Ai
in A, i.e., the action correspondence KΓ : X → A is defined by KΓ(x) = Ai
if x ∈ Xi;
(5) the payoff for any player x ∈ X is a function UΓ : X → C(A×∏j∈IM (Aj))
such that for each i ∈ I and any x = (t, i) ∈ Xi,
UΓ(x)(ai, (µj)j∈I) = Gi(t, ai, (µj)j∈I), (5.5)
where ai ∈ Ai and (µj)j∈I ∈
∏
j∈IM (Aj).
Clearly, UΓ is measurable by the fact that Gi is measurable from Ti to R
given any (ai, (µj)j∈I) ∈ Ai×
∏
j∈IM (Aj) (see, e.g., (Aliprantis and Border, 1999,
Theorem 4.54)). Thus, we have that
Lemma 10. UΓ is a semi-large game.
Now we are ready to establish a useful connection between Bayesian and semi-
large games.
Theorem 9. If the Bayesian game Γ satisfies condition C1, then it induces a semi-
large game and it has a pure strategy equilibrium iff the induced semi-large game
has one.
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Next we introduce the following diffuse condition for a Bayesian game:
(C2) Each players’ strategy-relevant private information is diffuse, i.e., τi is
atomless for each i.
By the construction of the agent space (X,X , λ), it is clear that if τi is atomless
for each i, then (X,X , λ) is also atomless. Thus, we have
Lemma 11. UΓ is a large game if condition (C2) also holds.
In this case, we shall also call UΓ the generic large game induced by the Bayesian
game Γ. Thus Theorem 9 together with Lemma 11 directly implies that
Theorem 10. If the Bayesian game Γ satisfies conditions C1 and C2, then it
induces a generic large game and it has a pure strategy equilibrium iff the induced
large game has one.
5.3.3 Pure-strategy equilibria for Bayesian games
By Theorem 8 and 10, we can easily show the following existence result.
Theorem 11. If the Bayesian game Γ satisfies C1, C2 and one of the following
four conditions:
(i) for each player i, her action space Ai is countable;
(ii) for each player i, her strategy-relevant information space (Ti,Ti, τi) is an
atomless Loeb probability space;
5.4 Bayesian games with private and public information 76
(iii) for each player i, her strategy-relevant information and payoff relevant infor-
mation are independent, i.e., νi = τi × δi;
(iv) for each player i, her payoff-relevant information Si is countable,
then there exists a pure strategy equilibrium for the game.
Remark 11. Cases (i) and (ii) in our theorem generalize Theorem 3 in Khan and Sun
(1995) and Theorem 3 in Khan and Sun (1999) respectively by allowing countably
infinite many players. Our results in cases (iii) and (iv) bring the payoff-relevant
information space into attention and to my best knowledge, these two cases are
new and have not been previously reported.
Remark 12. Although we can always induce a large game from a Bayesian game,
it is not correct to say that we can also induce a Bayesian game from an arbitrary
large game. This is clear from the definition of the function Gi in Equation 5.4.
Thus by our theorem 10, we may regard large games as prototypes of Bayesian
games but not vice versa.
5.4 Bayesian games with private and public in-
formation
In this section, we shall consider a new game model introduced in Fu et al. (2007a).
In addition to all the information spaces considered in Bayesian games, this game
5.4 Bayesian games with private and public information 77
model contains another two types of information, the public information and com-
mon information, where the former influences all players’ strategies and the latter
influences all players’ payoffs. As pointed out in Fu (2007), such a game model has
practical meaning and can be regarded as a useful generalization to the Bayesian
games discussed in the last section.
Now let a Bayesian game with private and public information be denoted by
Υ and formulated as follows. The game has countable players i ∈ I. For each
player i, her action set Ai, strategy-relevant private information space (Ti,Ti) and
payoff-relevant private information space (Si,Si) are defined in the same way as
those in Section 5.3.
Now let a countable (finite or countably infinite) set T0 = {t0k : k ∈ K}
represent those states that are to be publicly announced to all the players. Let
T0 be the power set of T0 and we call the measurable space (T0,T0) the public
information of all the players. Let another countable set S0 = {S0k : q ∈ Q} with
its power set S0 represent the (payoff-relevant) common information that affects
the payoffs of all players. The product measurable space (Ω′,F ′) = (T0 × S0 ×∏
i∈I(Ti × Si),T0 ⊗S0 ⊗
⊗
i∈I(Ti ⊗Si)) equipped with a probability measure η′
constitutes the total information space of the game Υ.
Let Λ :=
∏
i∈I Ai. For each player i, her payoff function is a mapping from
Λ × S0 × Si to R, i.e., ui : Λ × S0 × Si → R. We assume that for each a ∈ Λ,
ui(a, s0, ·) isSi-measurable, and for each (s0, si) ∈ (S0, Si), ui(·, s0, si) is continuous
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on Λ. We also assume that ui satisfies the uniform integrability condition, that is,
there is a real-valued integrable function ϕi on (Ω
′,F ′, η′) such that |ui| ≤ ϕi.
Definition 7. (1) In the game Υ, a pure strategy for each player i is an element
of Meas(T0×Ti, Ai). A pure strategy profile is a collection h = (hi)i∈I of pure
strategies that specifies a pure strategy for each player.





ui((hj(t0, tj))j∈I , s0, si)dη′. (5.6)
A pure strategy (Bayesian Nash) equilibrium of Υ is a pure strategy profile
h = (hi)i∈I such that for each i ∈ I, Ei(hi, h−i) ≥ Ei(h′i, h−i) for all h′i ∈
Meas(T0 × Ti, Ai).
Let the marginal measure of η′ on (T0 × S0,T0 ⊗S0) be denoted by η′0. For
each given t0k ∈ T0 and s0q ∈ S0, let ηkq denote the conditional probability measure




i∈I(Ti ⊗Si)); such a conditional probability
measure always exists since both T0 and S0 are countable. For each player i ∈ I,
let τi be the marginal measure of η
′ on the space (Ti,Ti), ρ
kq
i the marginal measure
of ηkq on the space (Ti×Si× T−i,Si⊗Ti⊗T−i), νkqi the marginal measure of ηkq
on the space (Ti × Si,Ti ⊗Si), τ kqi be the marginal measure of ηkq on the space
(Ti,Ti), and δ
kq
i be the marginal measure of η
kq on the space (Si,Si).
We suppose our game model also satisfies the following conditions:
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(D1) Each player’s private information is conditionally independent of all other
players’ strategy-relevant private information given the public and common infor-






j for all i, k and q, and
(D2) Each players’ strategy-relevant private information is diffuse, i.e., τi is
atomless for each i.
Theorem 12. If the generalized Bayesian game Υ satisfies D1, D2 and one of the
following four conditions:
(i) for each player i, her action space Ai is countable;
(ii) for each player i, her strategy-relevant private information space (Ti,Ti, τi)
is an atomless Loeb probability space;
(iii) for each player i, her strategy-relevant private information and payoff rele-
vant private information are conditionally independent given the public and
common information, i.e., νkqi = τ
kq
i × δkqi , for all k and q;
(iv) for each player i, her payoff-relevant private information Si is countable,
then there exists a pure strategy equilibrium for the game.
Remark 13. Although the proof of this theorem involves some other techniques,
the main idea is the same as that in the proof of Theorem 11, that is, we transform
our game to be in the form of large games and then use the existence results in
large games to show our intended results.
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Remark 14. By allowing countably infinite many players and a countable payoff-
relevant common information space, case (i) of this theorem covers and improves
the corresponding result in Fu (2007) and Fu et al. (2007a). Case (ii) generalizes
Theorem 4.1 of Loeb and Sun (2007) by allowing countably infinite many players.
To my best knowledge, our results in cases (iii) and (iv) are new and have not been
reported.
5.5 Concluding remarks
In this chapter it is revealed that large games can be served as a ‘prototype’ of
Bayesian games, at least in terms of pure strategy equilibria. This relationship
not only contributes to the discovery of novel results and the generalization of
old results but also helps to remarkably simplify the proofs. It can also help us
better understand the roles played by those regularity conditions. We hope our
approach can also be applied to the other aspects of these games, including the
mixed strategy equilibria and bring more benefits to the research.
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5.6 Proofs
5.6.1 Proof of Theorem 7
For each group i ∈ I, let Bµi : Ti ³ Ai be the restriction of Bµ to Ti and
Ui : Ti → C(Θ) the restriction of U to Ti. Define Vi : Ti → C(Θi) by let-
ting Vi(t) = Ui(t)|Θi , where Ui(t)|Θi is the restriction of Ui(t) to Θi and C(Θi)
is also endowed with the topology of compact convergence. Thus, we also have
Bµi (t) = argmaxa∈Ai Vi(t)(a, µ). As mentioned early in the chapter, each topologi-
cal space is endowed with its Borel σ-algebra on which we define the measurability.
Now we claim that Vi is also measurable. To see this, we first define Wi :
C(Θ) → C(Θi) by letting Wi(u) = u|Θi for all u ∈ C(Θ). Thus Vi = Wi ◦ Ui and
hence we only need to show that Wi is measurable. Let d be the usual metric on
R. Given an element f of C(Θi), a compact subset D of Θi and a number ² > 0,
let BΘi(f,D, ²) = {g ∈ C(Θi) : sup{d(f(x), g(x))|x ∈ D} < ²}. Thus the sets
BΘi(f,D, ²) form a basis for the topology of compact convergence on C(Θi).(See,
eg, p 283 in Munkres (2000)) Hence we only need to show that W−1i (BΘi(f,D, ²))
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is measurable. To see this, let ∆ = {u ∈ C(Θ) : u|D = f} and note that
W−1i (BΘi(f,D, ²)) = {h ∈ C(Θ) : h|Θi ∈ BΘi(f,D, ²)}









SinceBΘ(u,D, ²) is open by the definition of the topology on C(Θ),W−1i (BΘi(f,D, ²))
is also open and hence measurable. Thus our claim is verified.
For all i ∈ I and any µ ∈ ∏i∈IM (Ai), define Γµi : C(Θi) ³ Ai by letting
Γµi (u) = argmaxa∈Ai u(a, µ) for all u ∈ C(Θi). Thus we have Bµi (t) = Γµi (Vi(t))
for all t ∈ Ti. By the Berge’s Maximum Theorem, Γµi is upper semicountinuous.22
Thus, (Γµi )
−1(F ) is measurable for all closed set F ∈ A.23 It is also straightforward
to verify that V −1i [(Γ
µ
i )
−1(F )] = (Bµi )
−1(F ) for any closed set F ∈ A. Since Vi is
measurable, λiV
−1






Φ(µ) = {η ∈
∏
i∈I
M (Ai) : ηi(E) ≤ λi[(Bµi )−1(E)] for each i ∈ I and any E ∈ B(A)}.
It is easy to see that Φ is nonempty,24 closed-valued and convex-valued.
22Note that the map fµ : A×U → R defined by fµ(a, u) = u(a, µ) is continuous (see Theorem
46.10 in Munkres (2000)).
23See, eg, Lemma 16.4 in Aliprantis and Border (1999).
24By the Measurable Maximum Theorem, Bµi admits a measurable selection gi. Thus η =
(λig−1i )i∈I is a trivial element of Φ(µ).
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Now we want to show that Φ is upper semicontinuous or, equivalently, has
a closed graph. Toward this end, we choose a sequence {(µm, ηm)}m∈N from∏
i∈IM (Ai) with η
m ∈ Φ(µm) for each m and converging to (µ0, η0). We need
to show that η0 ∈ Φ(µ0).
Fix any i ∈ I. Let F be a closed subset of Ai and let Λm := (Γµmi )−1(F )
and Λ0 := (Γ
µ0
i )
−1(F ). Since Γµ
0
i is upper semicontinuous and F is closed, Λ0
is also closed. Since Θi is compact, C(Θi) is metrizable and we let dˆ be one of
the compatible metrics on C(Θi). For all k = 1, 2, . . ., let Gk = {u ∈ C(Θi) :
dˆ(u,Λ0)} < 1k}.
Fix any k. We claim that Λm ⊂ Gk for large enough m. To see this, let
um ∈ Λm, which, by the definition of Λm, implies that there is an am ∈ F such
that um(am, µ
m) = maxa∈Ai um(a, µ
m). Since µm → µ0 and um is uniformly con-
tinuous on Ai ×
∏
i∈IM (Ai)




. Thus it is straightforward to find a continuous real func-






.26 Thus u′m ∈ Λ0 and um ∈ Gk.
Hence, the above result and our hypothesis imply that ηmi (F ) ≤ λiV −1i (Λm) ≤
λiV
−1
i (Gk) for large enough m. Since η
m
i (F ) → η0i (F ), we have that η0i (F ) ≤
λiV
−1








25Continuous real function on compact metric space is also uniformly continuous.
26Just let u′m be a little bit bigger than um around the area of am.
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Now we want to show the above result holds for all Borel set E ∈ A. To see
this, recall that every probability measure on a Polish space is regular.27 Therefore,
we have
η0i (E) = η
0
i (E ∩ Ai) = sup{η0i (F ) : F is closed and F ⊆ E ∩ Ai}
≤ sup{λi[(Bµ0i )−1(F )] : F is closed and F ⊆ E ∩ Ai}




Since the above arguments hold for all i ∈ I, we conclude that η0 ∈ Φ(µ0).
Therefore Φ also has a closed graph, hence by the Ky Fan fixed point theorem in
Fan (1952), there is a fixed point µ∗ ∈ Φ(µ∗). ¥
5.6.2 Proof of Theorem 9
We have seen from Lemma 10 that Γ induces a semi-large game UΓ. Hence we
only need to show the equivalence of the pure strategy equilibrium for Γ and UΓ.
Sufficiency (⇐): Suppose that f : X → A is a pure strategy equilibrium of the
game UΓ. Thus, for almost all x ∈ X,
UΓ(x)(f(x), (λif
−1
i )i∈I) ≥ UΓ(x)(a, (λif−1i )i∈I) for all a ∈ KΓ(x) (5.7)
where fi is the restriction of f to Xi.
Now define gi : Ti → Ai by letting gi(ti) = fi(ti, i) for all ti ∈ Ti, and let
g = (gi)i∈I . Obviously, g is a pure strategy profile of Γ and we also have that






i . By Equations (5.5) and (5.7), we have that for any i ∈ I and
τi-almost all ti ∈ Ti,
Gi(ti, gi(ti), (τjg
−1
j )j∈I) ≥ Gi(ti, a, (τjg−1j )j∈I) for all a ∈ Ai.
Thus, by Equation (5.3), we have that for all i ∈ I,
Ei(g) ≥ Ei(g′i, g−i) for all g′i ∈ Meas(Ti, Ai).
Hence g is a pure strategy equilibria of Γ.
Necessity (⇒): Now let g = (gi)i∈I be a pure strategy equilibrium for the
Bayesian game Γ. Define fi : Xi → Ai by letting fi(x) = gi(t) for all x = (t, i) ∈ Xi
and define f : X → A by f(x) = fi(x) if x ∈ Xi.
Suppose now f is not a pure strategy equilibrium for the game UΓ. Then there




i )i∈I ] < U
Γ(x)[a, (λif
−1
i )i∈I ] for some a ∈ KΓ(x).
Now let Bµ be the best-response correspondence for the game UΓ where µ :=
(λif
−1
i )i∈I and let φ be a measurable selection of B
µ. Define g′i : Ti → Ai by
letting g′i(ti) = fi(ti, i) if (ti, i) ∈ Xi − Ci and g′i(ti) = φ(ti, i) if (ti, i) ∈ Ci. Let
Di = {ti : (ti, i) ∈ Ci}. Thus, by the fact that Gi does not depend on τig−1i (see












j )j∈I) > Gi(ti, gi(ti), (τjg
−1
j )j∈I) for all ti ∈ Di.
Thus, by Equation (5.3), we also have Ei(g
′
i, g−i) > Ei(g) which contradicts with
the claim that g is a pure strategy equilibrium for the Bayesian game Γ. Therefore,
our hypothesis is false and f is indeed a pure strategy equilibrium for the game
UΓ. ¥
5.6.3 Proof of Theorem 11
By Theorem 10, cases (i) and (ii) of Theorem 11 follow directly form cases (i) and
(iii) of Theorem 8, and cases (iii) and (iv) of Theorem 11 can be derived from case
(ii) of Theorem 8 by adopting the following transformations.
Consider case (iii) first. Suppose that the condition (iii) holds, i.e., νi = τi × δi
and let g = (gj)j∈I be a pure strategy profile. Then by Equation (5.1), the expected













































where G′i is a function from Ai ×
∏










for any (µj)j∈I ∈
∏
j∈IM (Aj). Obviously, G
′




Notice that G′i does not depend directly on ti now. Therefore, following the
same procedure in Section 5.3.2, we can induce a generic large game UΓ of Γ with
the property that all players in group i play the same payoff function G′i. Thus,
by Theorem 10 and case (ii) of Theorem 8, our result in case (iii) holds.
Now suppose the condition (iv) holds, that is, Si = (siq)q∈Q, where Q is a
countable index set. For simplicity, let αq := δi(siq) for all q ∈ Q, and given
siq ∈ Si, let the conditional probability of νi on Ti be denoted by τ qi . Let g = (gj)j∈I









































































i is a function from Ai ×
∏
j∈IM (Aj) to R, defined by
G
′′













for any (µj)j∈I ∈
∏









is well defined with







(ti) = 1 for τi-almost all ti. Obviously, G
′′
i is also
continuous from Ai ×
∏
j∈IM (Aj) to R.
Also notice that G
′′
i does not depend directly on ti now. Therefore, following
the similar procedure in Section 5.3.2, we can induce a generic large game UΓ of
Γ with the property that all players in group i play the same payoff function G
′′
i .
Thus, by Theorem 10 and case (ii) of Theorem 8, our result in case (iv) holds. ¥
5.6.4 Proof of Theorem 12
Fix i ∈ I. For simplicity, we denote η′0({t0k, s0q}) by βkq. Notice that the condi-
tional probability τ kqi is uniquely defined only when β
kq > 0. When βkq = 0, we can





kqτ kqi , τ
kq
i
is atomless and absolutely continuous with respect to τi whenever β
kq > 0. There-
fore, we can assume that for each k ∈ K, q ∈ Q, τ kqi is atomless and absolutely
continuous with respect to τi. Let φ
kq
i be the Radon-Nikodym derivative of τ
kq
i
with respect to τi, which is integrable on (Ti,Ti, τi). Also, let (M (Ai))|Q| be the
product space of |Q| copies of M (Ai) with the product topology, which is also a
compact metrizable space.
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Let h = (hi)i∈I be a pure strategy profile. Denote hi(t0k, ti) by hki (ti) for all
k ∈ K. Thus, for each k, hki is a measurable mapping from Ti to Ai. With the






































j (tj))j∈I , s0q, si)d
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i (ti), a−i, s0q, si)d
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Define the regular conditional expectation vkqi (a, ti) = E{ui(a, s0q, si)|ti} as we












i (ti), a−i, ti)dτ
kq
i . (5.11)























































































to R, defined by


















, where γi = (γ
q
i )q∈Q.






, wki (ai, ti, γ)







follows from the Stone-Weierstrass theorem.
Now compare Equations (5.13) and (5.14) with Equations (5.3) and (5.4) in
Section 5.3.2. We see they have the same properties. Thus, following the same
procedure in Section 5.3.2, we see that for each k ∈ K, the term V ki can induce
a large game Uk whose payoff is give by Uk = wki . By the same reasoning as in
Theorem 10, we have that there exists a hk∗ = (hk∗i )i∈I such that for all i ∈ I,
V ki (h
k∗) ≥ V ki (hki , hk∗−i), for all hki ∈ Meas(Ti, Ai) (5.15)
iff there is a pure strategy equilibrium for the game Uk.
Now suppose for each k ∈ K, hk∗ = (hk∗i )i∈I satisfies Equation (5.15). Then the
pure strategy profile h∗ = (h∗i )i∈I for game Υ defined by letting h
∗
i (t0k, ti) = h
k∗
i (ti)
for all k ∈ K and ti ∈ Ti is obviously a pure strategy equilibrium for game Υ.
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Therefore, parts (i) and (ii) in our theorem follow from parts (i) and (iii) in
Theorem 8 and parts (iii) and (iv) in our theorem follow from part (ii) in Theorem
8 by doing some similar transformation as illustrated in the Proof of Theorem 11.
¥
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